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END THE EXPERIMENT: THE 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD 
NOT PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS IN 
THE ALLIED LAWYER SETTING 
BY GRACE M. GIESEL* 
In recent years, courts have seen an explosion of claims that 
communications need not be disclosed because they enjoy the protection 
of something often referred to as the “common interest doctrine.”  These 
claims—claims of attorney–client privilege—occur in two situations: the 
joint client setting and the allied lawyer setting.  In a joint client situation, 
an attorney represents two or more clients on a matter with all parties 
working together on the joint endeavor.  In an allied lawyer situation, 
several entities or individuals work together on a matter of common 
interest but the parties have separate lawyers. 
This Article argues, uncontroversially, that the privilege should 
continue to apply to communications in the joint client situation.  In 
contrast, this Article argues, quite controversially, that communications in 
the allied lawyer setting should not enjoy the protection of the privilege.  
Applying the privilege to the joint client setting is simply applying the 
privilege to communications between an attorney and that attorney’s 
clients—clients who have engaged the attorney to represent them jointly. 
Applying the privilege furthers the rationale of the privilege.  When the 
privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the privilege 
protects communications that are not between an attorney and that 
attorney’s client.  The application does not further the privilege’s 
rationale.  In addition, the confusion surrounding the application of the 
privilege in this setting has eviscerated the certainty necessary for the 
privilege to accomplish any goal.  Any possible benefit to the application 
is outweighed by the damage done to the truth-finding mission of the 
justice system.  Applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting is a 
practice based on a flawed precedent from 1871 and followed by courts 
 
* James R. Merritt Professor and Distinguished University Teaching Professor, 
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only in recent decades.  It is a practice that should not continue. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years courts have seen a veritable explosion of claims1 that 
communications need not be disclosed because they enjoy the 
protection of something often referred to as the “common interest 
doctrine,”2 the “joint defense privilege,”3 the “community of interest 
doctrine,”4 or some similar term.5  These claims are, in effect, claims of 
 
1. A search in the ALLCASES portion of the Westlaw database revealed that 168 cases 
in the decade spanning 2000–2009 contained a reference to the Digest Key for Privileges 
entitled “Common interest doctrine; joint clients or joint defense.”  In contrast, in the decade 
spanning 1970–1979, only twenty-five cases contained such a reference. 
2. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 
2010); Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 143 (2007). 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 416 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005). 
4. See, e.g., In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). 
5. See, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“community-of-interest (or common-interest) privilege”); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. 
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attorney–client privilege.6  Parties to litigation and courts use these 
terms in two basic situations.  This Article refers to these situations as 
the joint client setting7 and the allied lawyer setting.8  In a joint client 
representation, an attorney represents two or more clients on a matter 
with all parties working together on the joint endeavor.  Those clients 
agree, expressly or implicitly, to have one attorney represent them all 
and render advice to all, jointly.9  Unlike in the joint client situation, in 
an allied lawyer situation several entities or individuals work together 
on a common matter, but the entities or individuals are separately 
 
QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 2005) (“common-interest 
exception”); N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v. Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 
1873291, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2010) (“joint defense or common interest privilege”; “joint 
defense exception”).  Some courts and commentators have noted the semantic confusion.  
See, e.g., Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[The] joint defense 
privilege has many monikers such as the common interest doctrine, common interest 
arrangement doctrine, or pooled information doctrine.  Unfortunately, courts, commentators, 
and attorneys use these terms interchangeably even when they do not serve the same 
purpose.”); see also George S. Mahaffey Jr., Taking Aim at the Hydra: Why the “Allied-Party 
Doctrine” Should Not Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the Government Declines to Intervene, 
23 REV. LITIG. 629, 631–33 (2004) (cataloguing the mishmash of terms before choosing 
“allied-party doctrine”). 
6. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(describing the “joint defense privilege” as “an extension of the attorney–client privilege”); 
Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (discussing the 
common interest doctrine as “an exception to the general rule that the attorney–client 
privilege is waived following disclosure of privileged materials to a third party”).  See 
generally Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge: A New Approach to 
Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449 (2002).  Some argue, however, that 
the privilege should be severed from the attorney–client privilege and stand alone.  See, e.g., 
Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
871, 874 (1996) (arguing that the “joint defense doctrine” is distinct from the attorney–client 
privilege). 
7. Section 75 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers refers to clients 
“jointly represented” by a lawyer as “co-client[s].”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000).  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct refer to 
this sort of representation as “common representation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 29–33 (2011). 
8. This term, coined by Wright and Graham, seems to best define the situation and 
separate it from the joint client situation.  See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5493 (1986) (using the term “allied 
lawyer doctrine”). 
9. An example of a joint client situation is one attorney representing two people who are 
both planning to invest in a business.  Both people might want legal advice with regard to 
those investments and agree that the attorney should represent them jointly.  For a discussion 
of joint client representation, see infra Part IV.A. 
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represented.10 
This Article argues, uncontroversially, that the attorney–client 
privilege should continue to apply to communications in the joint client 
situation.  Thus, the attorney–client privilege should apply if the 
communications involve an attorney and the attorney’s joint clients and 
if the communications are for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, are 
made in confidence, and do not further a crime or fraud.11 
This Article also argues, quite controversially and contrary to recent 
precedent, that communications in the allied lawyer setting should not 
enjoy the advantage of a privilege.  In contrast to how the privilege 
works in the allied lawyer setting, applying the privilege to the joint 
client setting is simply applying the privilege to communications 
between an attorney and that attorney’s clients—clients who have 
engaged the attorney to represent them jointly.  Applying the privilege 
in the joint client setting furthers the rationale of the privilege.  When 
the privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the 
privilege protects communications that are not between an attorney and 
that attorney’s clients.  Thus, the application in the allied lawyer setting 
does not further the privilege’s rationale.  In addition, the confusion 
surrounding the application of the privilege in this setting has 
eviscerated the certainty necessary for the privilege to accomplish any 
goal.  Any possible benefit is outweighed by the damage done to the 
truth-finding mission of the justice system.  Applying the privilege in the 
allied lawyer setting is a practice based on a flawed precedent from 1871 
and followed by courts only in recent decades.12  It is a practice that 
should not continue. 
Historically, courts have applied the attorney–client privilege readily 
to communications in the joint client situation when a third party is 
seeking disclosure.  This application has not been the subject of 
 
10. An example of this situation from the criminal context is two defendants charged 
with robbery who each have an attorney and who desire to work together to present a 
consistent defense.  An example in a civil context is a situation in which a corporation and 
one of its officer-employees are sued individually.  The corporation and the officer-employee 
may have separate attorneys but choose to work together on a common defense.  For a 
discussion of the allied lawyer situation, see infra Part V. 
11. See infra Part II for a discussion of the attorney–client privilege in general.  See 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994), for a typical 
definition of the attorney–client privilege.  
12. See infra Parts III.A, III.C. 
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dispute.13  In fact, the application of the attorney–client privilege to the 
joint client setting has served to define the total-sharing and no-secrets 
nature of a joint client representation. 
Conversely, in the allied lawyer situation, members of a group who 
have agreed to work together on a matter have separate attorneys.  The 
attorneys might share with each other communications each has had 
with his or her own client.  One or all clients and one or all attorneys 
might meet and discuss matters.  The clients themselves might discuss 
matters without the presence of an attorney.  Unlike the 
communications in the joint client setting, these communications are not 
solely between attorney and client.14  Rather, these communications 
occur within the circle of clients and the attorneys who represent those 
persons or entities separately.  Courts have faced increasing numbers of 
claims that such communications should be privileged under the 
common interest doctrine or a synonym of that doctrine.15 
There is a semantic confusion of terminology in this area of 
attorney–client privilege jurisprudence.  But this area of law is rife with 
a confusion of substance as well—a confusion leading to a suboptimal 
result in attorney–client jurisprudence.16  The remedy is to eliminate 
application of the privilege to the allied lawyer setting while embracing 
the historically accepted application of the attorney–client privilege to 
the joint client situation. 
 
13. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854); Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 
(39 Sickels) 72, 76 (1881). 
14. Not all courts agree that the privilege applies if an attorney is not present.  See, e.g., 
Cooper Health Sys. v. Virtua Health, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 208, 214 (D.N.J. 2009) (“[T]he privilege 
does not extend to communications between non-attorneys who simply have a joint interest.  
The community of interest privilege is applicable to communications amongst 
attorneys . . . .”); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The 
defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations 
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of 
those conversations.  Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is 
rejected.”); see also discussion infra Part V.F.4. 
15. Of the twenty-five cases in the decade 1970–1979 contained in the Westlaw 
ALLCASES database and cataloged in the Digest Key for Privileges entitled “Common 
interest doctrine; joint clients or joint defense,” only five of the cases involved allied lawyer 
settings.  In the decade of 2000–2009, the vast majority of the 168 cases cataloged in that 
Digest Key involved allied lawyer settings.  See, e.g., United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (exploring the allied lawyer context and “joint defense privilege”); 
United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing the allied lawyer context 
and “common legal interest rule”).  
16. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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The attorney–client privilege exists to encourage clients to make 
complete disclosure to their attorneys.17  The privilege protects 
communications between attorneys and clients from compelled 
disclosure and this protection encourages clients to make full disclosure 
to their counsel.  Full disclosure allows lawyers to render the best and 
most apt legal advice.  In a preventative view, clients may adapt their 
conduct to abide by the law in response to this superior advice.  If 
clients, though not perfectly certain, are at least generally certain that 
the privilege protects their communications with counsel from disclosure 
in future proceedings, clients may disclose more fully.18 
This rationale justifies applying the privilege to joint client 
situations.  A communication between an attorney and one or more of 
the attorney’s joint clients is a communication between attorney and 
client.  Protecting such communications from disclosure with the 
attorney–client privilege, theoretically, encourages full disclosure by the 
client group to the attorney.19  Applying the attorney–client privilege in 
the joint client situation thus furthers the ultimate goal of superior legal 
advice.  Courts have accepted application of the privilege in the joint 
client setting throughout the life of the modern attorney–client 
privilege;20 recognition of the privilege in this setting does not expand 
traditional doctrine.  Indeed, the nature of joint representation and the 
ethical constraints on any attorney handling a joint representation make 
application of the privilege relatively straightforward.21 
 
17. See infra notes 68–69, 72–75 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra Part II for a discussion of the attorney–client privilege and its rationale. 
19. See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:30 
(2011) (“The rationale for extending the protection of the attorney–client privilege to 
communications among several clients and their jointly retained attorney is no different from 
the basic rationale for the attorney–client privilege itself.  It ensures more informed, and 
therefore, more effective legal advice and assistance, through the concerted efforts of 
individuals with common legal interests.”); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the attorney–client privilege is to “encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients”).  
20. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854) (applying privilege to joint 
client situation); Harris v. Daugherty, 11 S.W. 921, 923 (Tex. 1889) (applying privilege to joint 
client situation); see also infra Part IV.B.3.  For a recent example of courts’ acceptance of the 
attorney–client privilege in the joint client setting, see Raymond v. N.C. Police Benevolent 
Ass’n, Inc., No. 230PA10, 2011 WL 1378605, at *3 (N.C. Apr. 8, 2011), in which the court 
stated, “This Court . . . has . . . recognized a multiparty attorney–client relationship in which 
an attorney represents two or more clients.”  The court then applied the privilege to such a 
joint client representation.  Id. at *4. 
21. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of joint clients and the attorney–client privilege. 
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In contrast, the disclosure-encouragement rationale does not justify 
applying the privilege to communications in the allied lawyer situation 
because any such privileged communication is not a communication 
between an attorney and that attorney’s client.  Applying the privilege 
in the allied lawyer context does not encourage frank attorney–client 
communications that can improve legal representation, which is the 
heart of the privilege’s purpose.22 
Other proposed justifying rationales—such as increased efficiency of 
representation, increased efficiency of the judicial system, or increased 
effectiveness of representation—cannot survive cost–benefit analysis.  
Any efficiency benefit to representation or to the judicial system as a 
whole is doubtful.23  Likewise, it is not at all clear that applying the 
attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer context improves the 
effectiveness of the representation rendered.24  Even if applying the 
privilege creates a benefit, the cost of creating that benefit—by limiting 
the information reaching the truth-finder and, therefore, handicapping 
the truth-finding process of the judicial system—outweighs any benefit 
created. 
The case credited as the first to apply the attorney–client privilege in 
the allied lawyer setting, the 1871 Virginia Supreme Court case of 
Chahoon v. Commonwealth,25 reached its conclusion by analogizing the 
allied lawyer situation to the joint client situation.26  The court decided 
that the allied lawyer situation was basically the same as the joint client 
situation and should be treated the same for purposes of attorney–client 
privilege.27 
This conclusion was in error.  The joint client situation differs 
fundamentally from the allied lawyer situation in the nature of the 
relationship between the attorneys and the clients.  That difference is 
central to the appropriateness of application of the attorney–client 
privilege.  In a joint client representation, the privilege applies to 
communications within an attorney–client relationship, as the attorney–
client privilege does in all other settings.  In an allied lawyer situation, 
 
22. See infra Part V for a discussion of the allied lawyer setting and the attorney–client 
privilege. 
23. See infra Part V.E; see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1528–30. 
24. See infra Part V.C.1. 
25. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871). 
26. Id. at 841.  
27. See id.  For a discussion of the Chahoon case, see infra Part III.A. 
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the communications are not within an attorney–client relationship.  In 
an allied lawyer setting, contrary to the conclusion of the Chahoon 
court, a lawyer does not represent other parties who have agreed to 
work with the lawyer’s client simply by virtue of an agreement between 
the parties to work together.  The lawyer does not have an attorney–
client relationship with those other parties; those parties have their own 
separate counsel.  Therefore, when a court applies the attorney–client 
privilege to communications in the allied lawyer setting, the privilege 
protects communications that are not solely between an attorney and 
the attorney’s client.  As some courts have applied the privilege, the 
privileged communication may not even involve a lawyer at all.28  The 
fact that the communication in the allied lawyer setting is not between 
an attorney and his or her client is a huge and fundamental difference 
between applying the privilege in the joint client setting and applying 
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting. 
Courts within the first one hundred years after the Chahoon case 
may have realized the faults in that opinion.  Only a few cases applied 
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting during that time.29  In recent 
years, however, the use of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting has 
increased greatly.30  This increase is a significant expansion of traditional 
privilege law.  This expansion has occurred even though courts 
throughout the life of the attorney–client privilege have counseled 
against expansion and warned that the privilege should be construed 
narrowly because of its potentially deleterious effect on truth-finding.31 
The few decades in which courts have applied the privilege in the 
allied lawyer setting have shown that the courts are not only deceived 
about the necessity of applying the privilege to the setting but also 
greatly flummoxed about how and when to apply the privilege in such 
settings.32  The federal system has no codified rule of evidence dealing 
with the attorney–client privilege or any related privilege,33 so the only 
 
28. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ. 6820(RBM)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (attorney not necessary). 
29. See infra Part III for a discussion of those cases. 
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra Part II.E. 
32. See infra Part V.A for a discussion about this confusion. 
33. See generally Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000) 
(discussing the disapproval of the proposed rule).  
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source of guidance is court-made law.  Some states have codified the 
attorney–client privilege.  Some of those states have included at least a 
passing reference to the allied lawyer and joint client concepts in the 
codifications.34  Even in such states, however, the courts shoulder much 
of the burden of developing the doctrine and filling in the interstices left 
 
34. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502; KY. R. EVID. 503; TEX. R. EVID. 503.  These statutes 
obliquely acknowledge the allied lawyer setting by stating that the privilege applies, for 
example, to a communication involving a lawyer representing another party in a matter of 
common interest.  See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 503(b) (limiting the allied lawyer concept to 
communications “[b]y the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a 
matter of common interest”); TEX. R. EVID. 503(b) (limiting the allied lawyer concept to 
communications “by the client or a representative of the client, or the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer, to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another 
party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest”).  State codifications 
indirectly acknowledge that the privilege applies to the joint client setting; the privilege no 
longer applies where joint clients later become adverse in an action and one former joint 
client seeks to have a communication from the joint representation produced and admitted.  
See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 503 (d)(5) (exception applies “to a communication relevant to a matter 
of common interest between or among two . . . or more clients if the communication was 
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action 
between or among any of the clients”); TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(5) (applying exception “to a 
communication relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more 
clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in 
common, when offered in an action between or among any of the clients”). 
 These states generally have followed Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, which was 
never adopted as the federal statute.  56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).  Proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 503 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
 (b) General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and 
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, 
(1)  between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s 
representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, or (3) by 
him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, 
or (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client. 
. . . . 
 (d) Exceptions.  There is no privilege under this rule: 
. . . . 
 (5) Joint Clients.  As to a communication relevant to a matter of common 
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of 
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action 
between any of the clients.  
56 F.R.D at 235. 
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by codification.35 
The courts have not proved themselves able to create a workable 
doctrine, and the courts’ opinions show a decided lack of clarity.  One of 
the biggest problems has been defining the commonality element 
necessary to justify the privilege in an allied lawyer setting.  In joint 
client representation, the nature of the representation provides the 
needed commonality because an attorney cannot ethically represent 
clients jointly unless the clients’ interests dovetail significantly.36  
Conversely, while all courts agree that a common interest is necessary in 
an allied lawyer situation for a communication to be privileged, court 
opinions do not uniformly define or apply the common interest 
requirement to the facts before those courts.37  Courts have tried to 
define the necessary common interest and have attempted to apply that 
definition to a vast myriad of possible fact settings.38  Yet, courts have 
not been able to do so in a way that allows parties to predict with a 
degree of certainty at the time of the communication that disclosure of 
the communication cannot be compelled at a later time.39  Certainty is 
vital, of course, if a privilege is to accomplish its goal.40  Absence of 
certainty eviscerates the impact of the privilege.41 
In addition, the courts have jumbled together claims arising in the 
joint client setting and those arising in the allied lawyer setting as if they 
were all the same to be governed by the same privilege doctrine.42  This 
 
35. For example, California has codified its attorney–client privilege at CAL. EVID. 
CODE §§ 950–962 (West 2009).  Even so, California courts are called upon to explain and 
clarify the reach of the privilege.  See, e.g., People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199 (Cal. 1995) 
(attorney need not be retained for the privilege to apply); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (clarifying bounds of privilege regarding a 
corporate client). 
36. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
37. See, e.g., Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 
143–44 (2007) (requiring a “common legal interest”); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974) (requiring “an identical legal interest”); see also In re 
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing various tests). 
38. See infra Part V.F for a discussion of attempts to define common interest and a 
discussion of the contexts in which courts have applied that concept. 
39. See infra Part V.F. 
40. See infra Part II.F for a discussion of certainty. 
41. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain privilege, or 
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is 
little better than no privilege at all.”).   
42. The Third Circuit, in Teleglobe Communications Corp., lamented that “much of the 
caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege (which is the same as the ‘common-
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trend has caused courts to view the common interest in the joint client 
setting as the same requirement as is demanded in the allied lawyer 
setting.  In the joint client setting, however, the commonality springs 
from the nature of the joint representation.  If there is a true joint 
representation, there should be no additional commonality requirement.  
If the communication is in furtherance of the joint representation, the 
privilege should apply to the communication.  No such inherent 
commonality exists in the allied lawyer setting,43 thus necessitating a 
definition of required commonality. 
Lack of clarity exists elsewhere as well.  Courts do not agree about 
the level of proof necessary regarding the intention to work together on 
a matter in the allied lawyer setting: some courts demand proof of an 
agreement, while other courts require less.44  Courts disagree about 
whether the privilege can exist in the allied lawyer setting if no litigation 
is in existence or at least on the horizon.45  Clearly, this is irrelevant in 
the joint client setting.  If the attorney ethically represents two or more 
clients as joint clients, the privilege applies regardless of the threat of 
litigation or the existence of any agreement between the clients. 
Finally, courts disagree about who must be a party to the 
communication in the allied lawyer setting to invoke the privilege.  
Some courts apply the privilege only if a communication involves an 
 
interest privilege’) with the co-client privilege.”  493 F.3d at 363 n.18 (internal citations 
omitted). 
43. The court in Teleglobe Communications Corp. noted this distinction: 
 
Second, while the Restatement (confusingly) uses the term “common interest” to 
describe the congruence of the parties’ interests in both co-client and community-
of-interest situations, the concepts are not the same.  Compare RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1) (“If two or more persons are 
jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either co-
client that . . . relates to matters of common interest is privileged as against third 
persons.”), with id. § 76(1) (“If two or more clients with a common interest in a 
litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree 
to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client 
. . . is privileged as against third persons.”) . . . .  In particular, because co-clients 
agree to share all information related to the matter of common interest with each 
other and to employ the same attorney, their legal interests must be identical (or 
nearly so) in order that an attorney can represent them all with the candor, vigor, 
and loyalty that our ethics require.   
493 F.3d at 365–66. 
44. See infra Part V.F.2 for a discussion of the proof of intention confusion. 
45. See infra Part V.F.3 for a discussion of the existence of confusion over the need for 
litigation. 
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attorney.  Some courts require both the discloser and the recipient to be 
lawyers.  Other courts appear willing to apply the privilege to any 
communications within the circle of parties and lawyers with a common 
interest.46 
The lack of a strong guiding rationale to temper the definition and 
application of the privilege in the allied lawyer situation is a major cause 
of the courts’ confusion.47  The confusion creates an uncertainty that 
undermines any goals the privilege is designed to achieve.  The 
confusion also means that no client can be sure of the protection that a 
statement may receive.  Thus, the privilege does not encourage the 
disclosure necessary for any possible justifying rationale.  If there is no 
encouragement of disclosure, then there is no raison d’etre for the 
privilege in the allied lawyer setting.48 
In addition, recognition of privilege in the allied lawyer situation 
contradicts one of the guiding principles of attorney–client privilege 
jurisprudence.  Courts have long taken great care in their delineation of 
the bounds of the attorney–client privilege because of the well-grounded 
speculation that the privilege keeps information vital to the truth-
finding process away from the truth-finder and thus hinders an ultimate 
goal of the entire judicial system.49  Courts repeat the mantra that the 
attorney–client privilege is to be applied narrowly in light of this 
deleterious effect on the truth-finding process.50  Applying a privilege to 
an allied lawyer situation is anything but a narrow application of the 
privilege.51 
Also, recognition of the privilege in allied lawyer situations 
disparages the confidentiality requirement of the privilege.  While 
 
46. See infra Part V.F.4 for a discussion of the existence of confusion about parties to the 
communication. 
47. See infra Part V.E. 
48. See infra Part II.F for a discussion about the need for certainty in a communication’s 
privilege to encourage disclosure. 
49. See infra Part II.E. 
50. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (finding that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly construed because it 
“obstructs the truth-finding process”). 
51. See infra Part V.D; see also Mahaffey, supra note 5, at 651 (“In light of the 
historically narrow approach taken to the application of privileges, it is a bit disconcerting 
that a number of courts have seen fit to broadly construe the attorney–client privilege and 
work–product doctrine of late.”). 
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historically not always so,52 the modern attorney–client privilege applies 
only to communications intended to be confidential.53  This 
confidentiality requirement minimizes the privilege’s harmful effect on 
the truth-finding process by limiting the set of possibly privileged 
communications.  The basis of the confidentiality requirement is the 
theory that a client who does not care about the confidentiality of a 
communication will disclose the information to his or her lawyer even 
without the privilege.  Protection of the privilege, thus, is not needed to 
encourage the communication.  In implementing the confidentiality 
requirement, modern courts generally have held that the presence of a 
third party for a communication indicates a lack of intent that the 
communication be confidential.  The result is that courts find such 
communications not privileged.54  Likewise, even though the 
communication between client and lawyer might be privileged at the 
time of the communication, courts have held that later sharing the 
 
52. In fact, the opinion in Chahoon, where a communication in an allied lawyer situation 
was first found to be privileged, may have been influenced by the earlier law of privilege that 
required no confidentiality.  An earlier view of the privilege, evidence of which is present in 
the Chahoon opinion, saw the privilege as a protector of the lawyer’s duty not to reveal client 
secrets that resulted from the confidential relationship.  See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 
Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 838 (1871) (“‘If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of 
professional employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either 
from a client or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employment on his 
behalf, matters which they know only through their professional relation to the client, they 
are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not 
be compelled to disclose the information, or produce the papers, in any court of law or equity, 
either as party or as witness.’” (quoting Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.) 
620; 1 My. & K. 98, 102)).  Under this older view of the privilege, since abandoned in the 
United States, courts should not force a lawyer to breach that duty to the client and reveal the 
secrets even if the information came from a source other than the client.  With this theory, the 
presence of third parties, when the communication between attorney and client occurred, was 
irrelevant.  See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 31, 47; Paul R. Rice, Attorney–Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of 
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 856 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding 
Concept]; Paul R. Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the 
Indefensible, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187–88 [hereinafter Rice, Bad Idea]. 
53. See infra Part II.D. 
54. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Kohn, Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279, at 
*7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010) (no privilege applies to conversations in presence of film crew); 
HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Although 
communications between client and counsel relating to legal advice are generally privileged, 
the privilege is waived where such communications are ‘made . . . in the known presence of a 
third party.’” (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (N.Y. 
1989))). 
08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:05 PM 
2011–2012] END THE EXPERIMENT 489 
 
communication with a third party waives the privilege because the 
sharing shows a lack of intent that the communication continue to be 
confidential.55  Applying the attorney–client privilege in the allied 
lawyer situation is inconsistent with this confidentiality requirement. 
Finally, abolishing privilege for the allied lawyer situation does not 
undo centuries of legal precedent.  Rather, the application of privilege 
to the allied lawyer situation is a creature of recent origin.56  Only four 
cases applied the privilege to the allied lawyer setting before 1965.57  
Only in the last three decades have claims of privilege in the allied 
lawyer situation become common and problematic.58  By abolishing the 
privilege for the allied lawyer situation, courts would simply be making a 
correction to a recently taken jurisprudential wrong turn. 
II.  THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
A.  The Modern Definition 
The modern attorney–client privilege is the client’s privilege; the 
client controls its assertion and waiver.59  The privilege prevents 
compelled disclosure of confidential communications that occur 
between an attorney and a client if the purpose of the communication is 
to obtain or render legal advice60 and if the communication is not in 
 
55. See, e.g., WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“[I]f a 
client shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party, then the 
communication is no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.”); see also 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (holding that the privilege was waived after client disclosed conversations 
with lawyer on blogs and otherwise). 
56. See infra Part III.C. 
57. See cases cited infra note 320. 
58. See infra Part III.C for a discussion about the recent explosion of cases where the 
privilege has been claimed in the allied lawyer setting. 
59. See Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 
privilege belongs to the client, although an attorney may assert the privilege on the client’s 
behalf.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The attorney–
client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may waive it.”); Lord Say & Seal’s Case, 
(1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 617, 617 (K.B.); 10 Mod. 45 (court held that privilege was not attorney’s 
but client’s); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 9:1. 
60. WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“The attorney–client privilege protects from 
compelled disclosure ‘any communication that satisfies the following elements: it must be (1) 
a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose 
of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.’” (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007))); see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (1961). 
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furtherance of a crime or fraud.61  The protection of the privilege ends if 
the client waives it.62  An often-quoted definition of the modern 
attorney–client privilege was stated by Judge Wyzanski in United States 
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:63 
 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a 
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) 
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in 
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the 
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers 
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on 
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal 
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or 
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not 
waived by the client.64 
 
61. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (“‘The 
privilege takes flight if the relation is abused.  A client who consults an attorney for advice 
that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.  He must let 
the truth be told.’” (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933))).  
62. The privilege can be expressly or impliedly waived, and the waiver can take many 
forms.  For example, the privilege can be waived by not taking reasonable precautions to 
protect the confidentiality of the communications.  See, e.g., In re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (leaving papers in public hallway destroyed the privilege).  The privilege may 
be waived by disclosure.  See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st 
Cir. 1997).  The privilege may be waived by the client making the communications a 
substantive issue; for example, by relying on the advice of counsel as a defense.  See, e.g., 
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1995); see also RICE, supra 
note 19, § 9:23. 
63. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). 
64. Id. at 358–59; see also United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1442 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358–59); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 
No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS), 2011 WL 9375, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011)  (quoting United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358–59). 
 Some states have codified the privilege.  For example, a New York statute states in 
pertinent part:  
 
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person 
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential 
communication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the 
course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such 
communication, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose such communication, 
in any action, disciplinary trial or hearing, or administrative action, proceeding or 
hearing conducted by or on behalf of any state, municipal or local governmental 
agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof.  Evidence of any 
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The party claiming the protection of the privilege has the burden of 
proving that it applies to the particular communication.65  Courts require 
the opponent to the claimant of the privilege to prove a prima facie case 
of waiver.66  Then, the claimant of the privilege must rebut the prima 
facie case to successfully claim the privilege.67 
 
such communication obtained by any such person, and evidence resulting 
therefrom, shall not be disclosed by any state, municipal or local governmental 
agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof.  The relationship of 
an attorney and client shall exist between a professional service corporation 
organized under article fifteen of the business corporation law to practice as an 
attorney and counselor-at-law and the clients to whom it renders legal services. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503(a) (McKinney 1992); see also KY. R. EVID. § 503(b) (“A client has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential 
communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client: (1) Between the client or a representative of the client and the client's 
lawyer or a representative of the lawyer; (2) Between the lawyer and a representative of the 
lawyer; (3) By the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a 
matter of common interest therein; (4) Between representatives of the client or between the 
client and a representative of the client; or (5) Among lawyers and their representatives 
representing the same client.”). 
65. See Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 
2007); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 225–26 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
66. See First Fed. Sav. Bank of Hegewisch v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 263, 267 (2003) 
(“The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden of establishing the elements of the 
privilege.  Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to 
establish a prima facie case of waiver. . . .  Next, the burden shifts back to the party asserting 
the privilege ‘to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that the privilege is still viable.’  
Therefore, in sum, plaintiff[s] must not only establish that the privilege applied, but also that 
the privilege was not waived.” (footnotes omitted)). 
67. Similarly, when a party claims that the privilege does not apply because the 
communication was in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the privilege claimant has the burden 
of proving that the privilege applies and then the opponent must show that the claim of crime 
or fraud has some basis in fact.  See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); see also 
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63, 568 (1989).  Exactly what must be shown is 
unclear.  For example, in In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 
2007), a civil matter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the burden should be a 
preponderance of the evidence.  In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 
1989), a criminal matter, the court required proof of “reasonable cause to believe” that the 
communication was in furtherance of a crime or fraud.  See, e.g., Cary Bricker, Revisiting the 
Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney–Client Privilege: A Proposal to Remedy the Disparity 
in Protections for Civil and Criminal Privilege Holders, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 149, 155 (2009). 
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B.  The Modern Rationale for the Privilege 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,68 the U.S. Supreme Court discussed 
the purpose of the modern rationale of the attorney–client privilege: 
 
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
[the] administration of justice.  The privilege recognizes that 
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such 
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully 
informed by the client.69 
 
68. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
69. Id. at 389; see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009) (“By 
assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make ‘full and frank’ disclosures 
to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide candid advice and effective 
representation.  This, in turn, serves broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981))); 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (“The privilege is intended to 
encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’” 
(quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (“Our cases 
make clear that an asserted privilege must also ‘serv[e] public ends.’  Thus, the purpose of the 
attorney–client privilege is to ‘encourage full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.’” (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 
464, 470 (1888) (“The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between 
client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, 
of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance 
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the 
apprehension of disclosure.”); Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 951 (Pa. 
2008) (“The attorney–client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney incompetent to 
testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free flow of 
information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better 
represent the client.”). 
 In an early statement of this rationale, an English court stated, 
 
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without 
employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in point 
of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and candidly disclose every 
thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be in the least relative to the 
affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly 
to serve him . . . . 
Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (Exch.) 1237 (Ir.).  For a discussion of this 
case, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney–Client Privilege, 
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1073–80 (1978).  The Annesley case involved the ownership of certain 
property.  Id. at 1073–74.  One of the claimants was the brother of a deceased earl who 
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The theory is that clients need the fully-informed advice of their 
attorneys so that they can determine how to proceed in accordance with 
the law.70  By proceeding in accordance with the law, the administration 
of justice, on a global measure, improves.71 
As so stated, this rationale is utilitarian.72  It has several premises.  
 
claimed that he inherited the earldom and the property rightfully from his childless brother.  
Id. at 1074.  The other claimant claimed to be the legitimate son of the deceased earl.  Id.  He 
claimed that his wicked step-mother gave him away and that his uncle, knowing of his 
identity, sought to have him wrongfully prosecuted and hanged for a murder he did not 
commit.  Id.  The claimed privileged communications were communications between the 
uncle and his attorney in which the uncle sought the attorney’s help in arranging for the 
prosecution.  Id.  Ultimately, the court recognized the privilege generally but did not apply it 
on these facts.  Id. at 1078; see Annesley, 17 How. St. Tr., at 1242. 
Commentators have suggested deontological justifications, such as the notion that the 
client’s privacy interest in the communication justified the privilege or the notion that respect 
for the client’s autonomy justifies the privilege.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of 
a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 349, 350 (1981); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: 
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112–13 (1956). 
70. See Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470 (1888) (finding that the privilege facilitates the 
“administration of justice”).  In United States v. Upjohn Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to apply the attorney–client privilege to communications between the 
corporation’s counsel and employees who were not in the control group of the corporation.  
600 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 (1979).  On review, the Supreme Court noted:  
 
The narrow scope given the attorney–client privilege by the court below not only 
makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their 
client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable 
efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law. 
Upjohn, 383 U.S. at 392.  
71. In its Upjohn decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “This policy of 
promoting full disclosure to counsel serves to implement the notion inherent in the first 
principle, that finding the truth and achieving justice in an adversary system are best served 
by fully-informed advocates loyal to their client's interests.”  600 F.2d at 1226 (citing Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are guided by [the attorney–client privilege’s] purpose ‘to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’  The 
privilege also ‘recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such 
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.’” (quoting 
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)). 
72. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 387 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); 2 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:13, at 520 
(3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2011); Note, Attorney–Client and Work Product Protection in a 
Utilitarian World: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1703–04 (1995); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000). 
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One premise is that clients will not be completely forthcoming with 
information when consulting an attorney unless they are certain that a 
court cannot compel disclosure of their communications with counsel.73  
Another premise of the rationale is that complete client disclosure yields 
superior legal advice.74  And a third premise is that superior legal advice 
will lead clients to observe and obey the law.75 
C.  Before the Modern Definition and the Modern Rationale 
In the sixteenth century, the attorney–client privilege was not a 
client’s privilege as it is now.  Rather, the privilege was a legal advisor’s 
privilege.76  The privilege developed in reaction to the Statute Against 
 
73. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court, in deciding whether the 
attorney–client privilege survived the death of a client, stated, “In the case at hand, it seems 
quite plausible that [the client], perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have sought 
legal advice from [the lawyer] if he had not been assured the conversation was privileged.”  
524 U.S. at 408 (1998). 
74. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or 
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s 
being fully informed by the client.”).  
75. Some commentators question the assumptions and the effect the privilege is thought 
to have.  See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary 
Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (2002); Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney–Client Confidentiality 
Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 485 (2002).  Empirical evidence does not shed 
much light on the issue.  See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409 n.4, in which the Supreme 
Court stated, 
 
Empirical evidence on the privilege is limited.  Three studies do not reach firm 
conclusions on whether limiting the privilege would discourage full and frank 
communication.  [Vincent C.] Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege: 
A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191 (1989); [Fred C.] Zacharias, 
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 352 (1989); Comment, Functional 
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the 
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962).  These articles note 
that clients are often uninformed or mistaken about the privilege, but suggest that a 
substantial number of clients and attorneys think the privilege encourages candor. 
Two of the articles conclude that a substantial number of clients and attorneys think 
the privilege enhances open communication, Alexander, supra, at 244–46, 261, and 
that the absence of a privilege would be detrimental to such communication, 
Comment, 71 Yale L.J., supra, at 1236.  The third article suggests instead that while 
the privilege is perceived as important to open communication, limited exceptions 
to the privilege might not discourage such communication, Zacharias, supra, at 382, 
386. 
76. See RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2; see also WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2290, at 544 (the 
privilege did not belong to the client because “[t]he pledge of secrecy had not been taken by 
him, and therefore the ‘point of honor’ was not his to make”).  A privilege of sorts for the 
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Perjury, enacted in the 1560s.77  The Statute Against Perjury provided 
that witnesses could be compelled to testify in court.78  At that time, 
parties to a matter were not viewed as competent to testify.79  The next 
best thing to testimony from the parties was testimony from the legal 
advisors of the parties about what the parties told their legal advisors. 
The legal advisor privilege developed to protect legal advisors from 
having to testify against their clients.80 
This privilege also protected the honor of the legal advisor by 
preventing a court from compelling the advisor to disclose the client’s 
secrets learned in the confidential relationship of attorney and client.81  
The premise of the privilege was that the legal advisor owed the client a 
duty of secrecy and should not be compelled to violate this duty.82  
Interestingly, the privilege applied regardless of the confidentiality of 
the communication at issue.83  The goal was to protect the legal advisor 
 
legal advisor may have existed in Roman times as well.  For example, Professor Max Radin, 
writing in the 1920s, notes that when Cicero was prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily, he 
commented that he could not summon the governor’s patronus (advisor).  See Max Radin, 
The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 
487, 488 (1928). 
77. 5 Eliz. I, c.9, § 6 (1562–3) (Eng.), cited in RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2. 
78. 5 Eliz. I, c.9, § 6 (1562–3) (Eng.), cited in RICE, supra note 19, § 1:2. 
79. See R. v. Inhabitants of Woburn, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 825 (K.B.); 10 East 395; see 
also Hazard, supra note 69, at 1082–83.  
80. See, e.g., Hartford v. Lee, (1603) 21 Eng. Rep. 34 (1603); Cary 63 (the court excused 
a solicitor from a subpoena to testify because he was a solicitor in the matter). 
81. See, e.g., Andrews v. Solomon, 1 F. Cas. 899, 900 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 378) (“An 
attorney is not permitted to disclose as a witness, the secrets of his client, because in doing so, 
he would betray a confidence, which from necessity the client must repose in him.”); Creed v. 
Trap, (1578–1579) 21 Eng. Rep. 74 (Ch.) 74 (stating that the legal advisor “shall not be 
examined upon any Interrogatories which shall compel him to discover any matter which 
came to his knowledge as a Solicitor or as of a Councel in this case”). 
82. Professor Max Radin explained that some lawyers were gentlemen and hypothesized 
that “the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in them” was 
the original basis of the privilege.  See Radin, supra note 76, at 487.  Attorneys and solicitors 
were more like servants and servants also had a duty to “keep his master’s secrets.”  See id.; 
see also RICE, supra note 19, §§ 1:3, 1:5; WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2291, at 553 (stating that 
it would be “repugnant to any honorable man to feel that the confidences which his relation 
naturally invites are liable at the opponent’s behest to be laid open through his own 
testimony,” which creates a “disagreeable inconsistency of being at the same time the solicitor 
and the revealer of the secrets,” which “double-minded attitude would create an unhealthy 
moral state in the practitioner”). 
83. See Leslie, supra note 52, at 48 (“Given this justification for the privilege, 
confidentiality was entirely irrelevant—the aim was to shelter the attorney from being forced 
to testify against his client and violate his trust.  The presence of a third party did not make 
the lawyer’s trust any less sacred.”). 
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from being the source of disclosure of the client’s secrets.  A secret was 
information told to the lawyer in the confidential relationship regardless 
of whether the client shared the information with others before or after 
talking with the legal advisor.84  If a client communicated to the legal 
advisor in the presence of a third party, the legal advisor privilege 
applied so that the advisor could not be compelled to disclose what the 
client had disclosed to the advisor.85  The third party could testify, 
however,86 so there was a disincentive to sharing information with 
others. 
In the 1700s and 1800s, some courts embraced the view that the 
privilege belonged to clients,87 not legal advisors.  Some courts began 
considering the privilege as justified by the modern utilitarian 
rationale,88 though other courts of that time continued to view the 
 
84. The privilege might apply even if the client’s secret comes from a source other than 
the client.  See Greenough v. Gaskell, (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch.), which states,  
 
If touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional 
employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either 
from a client, or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, 
or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their 
employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their professional 
relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but 
bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or 
produce the papers in any Court of law or equity, either as party or as witness. 
Id. at 620.   
85. See, e.g., Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519, 521 (1859) (stating that, though a 
third party overheard an attorney–client communication, the attorney could not testify 
because the privilege applied). 
86. For example, in Hoy, the court stated that a third party, who overheard an attorney–
client communication, could testify though the attorney could not.  Id.; see also Goddard v. 
Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859) (“The rule which enjoins the attorney's silence does not 
extend to such a witness, and the court below erred in refusing to hear his testimony.”). 
87. See RICE, supra note 19, § 1:3.  For two examples, see Baker v. Arnold, 1 Cai. R. 258, 
266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (holding the privilege is the client’s); and Lord Say & Seal’s Case, 
(1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 617 (K.B.) (stating that “[t]he Court were of opinion . . . that an 
attorney’s privilege was the privilege of his client”). 
88. See, e.g., Annesley v. Anglesea, (1743) 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (Exch.) 1237 (Ir.) (“No 
man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without employing and 
consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not 
let him; and if he does not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he 
apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be 
impossible for the attorney properly to serve him . . . .”).  For a discussion of the case, see 
Hazard, supra note 69, at 1073 (“This case reads like a source material for a Dickens novel—
indeed, its facts make David Copperfield seem a pale contrivance.”).  Professor Melanie 
Leslie has noted that the two rationales “co-existed for some time, with the result that the 
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privilege as belonging to the legal advisor.89  Eventually, the modern rule 
and rationale became the universally accepted rule.90 
D.  The Confidentiality Requirement 
Today, any definition of the modern attorney–client privilege 
includes a requirement that the communication be confidential at its 
inception.91  In addition, the communication must be kept confidential 
for the communication to continue to be protected by the privilege.92  
The confidentiality mandate is not absolute,93 but it does require that the 
 
details of the attorney–client privilege, including the existence of a confidentiality 
requirement, remained muddled through the nineteenth century.”  See Leslie, supra note 52, 
at 49.  
89. See, e.g., Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 634 (Exch.) 635.  In the case, the 
Chief Baron stated, “I cannot accede to the proposition . . . that the privilege of an attorney is 
the privilege of the client.”  Id. 
90. See Imwinkelried, supra note 75, at 249 (stating that the modern rule and rationale 
became the “dominant paradigm”). 
91. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“A 
communication is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than 
the client, its attorney, or their agents are present.  Similarly, if a client shares an otherwise 
privileged communication with a third party, then the communication is no longer 
confidential and the client has waived the privilege.” (citation omitted) (citing In re Teleglobe 
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007))). 
92. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(stating the privilege will only be recognized when “the communication between the client 
and the attorney is made in confidence of the relationship and under circumstances from 
which it may reasonably be assumed that the communication will remain in confidence”); see 
also Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 52, at 856–57. 
93. There are situations in which communications are disclosed and yet the 
communication does not lose the protection of the privilege.  For example, an inadvertent 
disclosure may result in opposing counsel viewing a privileged document, yet the court may 
determine that the client has not waived the privilege.  See, e.g., Ergo Licensing, LLC v. 
Carefusion 303, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 40, 46–47 (D. Me. 2009) (finding no waiver in a disclosure of 
thirty-one privileged documents in a group of 540 documents produced in response to a 
discovery request and stating that “[w]hether a waiver of the attorney–client privilege is 
accomplished by the inadvertent disclosure of documents is evaluated by a three-element test: 
‘1) the disclosure must be inadvertent; 2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure; and 3) the holder promptly took steps to rectify 
the error’” (quoting Rhoades v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Pitt., Civil 
Action No. 09-261, 2009 WL 3319820, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2009))); Nova Se. Univ., Inc. v. 
Jacobson, 25 So. 3d 82, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (applying a five-part test that considered 
“1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; 2) the 
number of inadvertent disclosures; 3) the extent of the disclosure; 4) the delay in measures 
taken to rectify the inadvertent disclosures; and 5) whether overriding interests of justice will 
be served by relieving the party of its error” in concluding that letter found on the office fax 
machine was protected by the attorney–client privilege (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 
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client reasonably and honestly believe the communication to be 
between the client and the attorney only.94  Courts view the presence at 
the time of the communication of third parties who are not agents of the 
attorney or the client as an indication that the client had no intention 
 
837 So. 2d 1010, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002))); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 
324–25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that privileged was maintained when a two-page email 
was disclosed due to clerical error after the parties had agreed to return inadvertently 
disclosed documents, reasonable precautions had been taken to prevent the disclosure, the 
disclosure was “minimal,” and the discloser acted promptly to have the document returned).   
 Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which became effective in 2008, states in part,  
 
 The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a 
communication or information covered by the attorney–client privilege or work-
product protection. . . . 
 . . . . 
 (b) Inadvertent disclosure.—When made in a Federal proceeding or to a 
Federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or 
State proceeding if:  
 (1) the disclosure is inadvertent;  
 (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure; and  
 (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, 
including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5)(B). 
FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see also Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. 
Palladium Equity Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849–51 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (applying 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and finding that “the defendants took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure during the . . . document production” requiring review of “63,025 
documents totaling an estimated 4.7 million pages” and that “the defendants took prompt 
steps to recall the documents once they realized that they had been disclosed”).  
 Also, the privilege applies to communications that are seized by a third party through 
illegal means though the seizure usually means the communications have been disclosed to 
third parties.  See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(excluding expert testimony based on a stolen document was excluded); State v. Today's 
Bookstore, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1283, 1288–89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that leaked 
memorandum remained privileged); see also Parnes v. Parnes, 915 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (App. 
Div. 2011) (finding that, although wife accessed husband’s e-mail without authorization, the 
e-mail retained privilege protection).  
94. See Tractenberg v. Twp. of W. Orange, 4 A.3d 585, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) (“Confidential communications are only those ‘communications which the client either 
expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances 
would be understood by the attorney as so intended.’” (quoting State v. Schubert, 561 A.2d 
1186, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989))); see also United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 
1329 (11th Cir. 1983) (talking loudly in a hallway does not indicate an intention that the 
statement be confidential). 
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that the communication be confidential.95  Thus, the communication is 
not protected by the privilege.  If the client later shares the 
communication with a third party, the courts view the sharing as an 
indication that confidentiality is no longer important.96  Thus, the 
communication is no longer protected by the privilege even though it 
may have been privileged before the act of sharing. 
This confidentiality requirement became a part of privilege law late 
in the nineteenth century.97  It acts not as a requirement that furthers the 
rationale of the attorney–client privilege but rather as a necessary limit 
on the privilege’s scope.98  The privilege acts to encourage a client to 
fully disclose information to the lawyer.  The rationale of the 
confidentiality requirement is that if a client does not care about the 
confidential nature of a communication, the client will readily disclose 
 
95. See WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“A communication is not made in confidence, 
and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its attorney, or their agents are 
present.”); In re Condemnation City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) 
(“Confidentiality is key to the privilege, and the presence of a third-party during attorney–
client communications will generally negate the privilege; presumably, the client does not 
intend communications to be confidential if they are heard by someone else.”); see also 
Chevron Corp. v. Kohn, Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 WL 5173279, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
20, 2010) (no privilege applies because a film crew was present); Curry v. McNeil, No. 
4:07cv351-SPM/WCS, 2008 WL 5157516, *5, *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2008) (the attorney–
client privilege did not apply to a telephone conversation between attorney and client because 
the client’s girlfriend was also on the call). 
96. See United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because confidentiality 
is critical to the privilege, it will be ‘lost if the client discloses the substance of an otherwise 
privileged communication to a third party.’” (quoting In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 
F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006))); WebXchange, 264 F.R.D. at 126 (“Similarly, if a client 
shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party, then the communication is 
no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.”); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1265 (D. Colo. 2010) (“Only confidential information is 
protected by the privilege; if the information has been or is later shared with third parties, the 
privilege does not apply.”); see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF 
(PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (discussing how the client disclosed 
conversations she had with her attorney on blogs and otherwise and finding waiver); Bower v. 
Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding there was no confidentiality 
where client left letter open on a table in a room in a suite where a third party was staying); In 
re Victor, 422 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“By placing the documents in the public 
hallway outside of Mr. Victor’s office, the privilege which might have theretofore existed with 
respect to these papers was totally destroyed.”). 
97. See RICE, supra note 19, § 6:3.  Professor Rice credits Professor Wigmore and his 
treatise for the general acceptance of the confidentiality requirement.  See Rice, Bad Idea, 
supra note 52, at 188 (“The change in the concept of confidentiality was brought about by 
Professor Wigmore in his influential treatise.”). 
98. See infra Part II.E for a discussion about the costs of the attorney–client privilege. 
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all necessary information to the lawyer without the encouragement of 
the privilege.99  So, the confidentiality requirement ensures that the 
privilege applies only where it is needed as an encouragement. 
E.  Inherent Costs of the Privilege 
The attorney–client privilege does not create benefit without cost.  
The cost of the privilege is the potential that applying the privilege in a 
particular situation will keep relevant evidence from the truth-finder.100  
As Professor Wigmore stated, “[T]he privilege remains an exception to 
the general duty to disclose.  Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; 
its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . .  It is worth preserving for the 
sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the 
investigation of the truth.”101 
 
99. See WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2311, at 599 (“The reason for prohibiting disclosure 
. . . ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy.”); see also Leslie, 
supra note 52, at 33 (“While the attorney–client privilege seeks to encourage client 
confidences, the confidentiality requirement exists to limit the exclusion of reliable evidence 
by ensuring that the privilege applies to only those statements that would not have been made 
absent the privilege.”).  Professor Paul Rice argues that the confidentiality requirement 
should be abolished because it is valueless.  He posits that, whether or not a communication is 
confidential, the client may value having the communication protected from compelled 
disclosure.  In other words, the client may not care who knows what he told his counsel, but 
he would not want that information used against him in a court of law.  See Rice, Eroding 
Concept, supra note 52, at 861 (“Confidentiality, therefore, should be abandoned as a 
requirement for the attorney–client privilege because compliance with it generates significant 
unnecessary costs in the preservation of the secrecy, the proof of that preservation, and the 
resolution of disputes surrounding it.”); see also Rice, Bad Idea, supra note 52, at 189. 
100. See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (“But the 
attorney–client privilege interferes with the truthseeking mission of the legal process, because 
it is in derogation of the public’s right to every man’s evidence.  Thus, the privilege is not 
favored by federal courts and is to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits 
consistent with the logic of its principle.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding 
process”); Jones v. Murphy, 256 F.R.D. 510, 512 (D. Md. 2008) (“The privilege is ‘not favored 
by the federal courts’ because it interferes with the truth seeking process and contravenes the 
right of citizens to evidence, and should be ‘strictly confined within the narrowest possible 
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 
F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984))); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 72, at 339 (“Their 
effect instead is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut 
out the light.”). 
101. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 2291, at 554.  The courts over the years often have 
quoted Wigmore’s statement of the costs of the privilege.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Harvey, 349 
F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965); Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186, 191 n.5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
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This cost is minimized by the fact that the privilege places 
communications between client and lawyer beyond the reach of 
compelled disclosure but does not protect the facts underlying the 
communications.102  Also, it is possible that no communication would 
exist without the privilege so there would be no communication kept 
from the truth-finder.103 
The courts’ acceptance of the absolute protection of the privilege 
along with codification by some jurisdictions104 indicates a collective 
conclusion that the privilege not only creates benefits but the benefits 
also exceed any cost of its application.105  Yet, in applying the privilege in 
 
(quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1975)); see 
also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege, 57 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982) (“Notwithstanding the interests that the attorney–client 
privilege purports to serve, even its staunchest proponents concede that, whenever the 
privilege is invoked, otherwise relevant and admissible evidence may be suppressed.  
Inherently, the attorney–client privilege, like all privileges, potentially hinders the 
administration of justice.”). 
102. The Supreme Court explained this in Upjohn Co. v. United States: 
 
[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to 
facts.  A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an 
entirely different thing.  The client cannot be compelled to answer the 
question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to 
disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he 
incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney. 
449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Phila. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)); see also Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. 
Simeone, The Realities of Attorney–Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1963).  But see 
Alexander, supra note 75, at 228–31. 
103. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court stated, 
 
In related cases, we have said that the loss of evidence admittedly caused by the 
privilege is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not 
have made such communications in the first place.  This is true of disclosure before 
and after the client’s death.  Without assurance of the privilege's posthumous 
application, the client may very well not have made disclosures to his attorney at all, 
so the loss of evidence is more apparent than real. 
524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Leslie, supra note 52, at 31 (“In a 
perfect world, then, the privilege would protect only reliable statements that would not 
otherwise have been made.”).  
104. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502; KY. R. EVID. 503; TEX. R. EVID. 503; see also supra 
note 34 and accompanying discussion. 
105. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“The privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the 
lawyer to provide advice and representation.  As the privilege serves the interests of justice, it 
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individual cases, courts continue to concern themselves with the damage 
to the truth-finding mission of the judicial system.  Courts often repeat a 
refrain that the privilege must be “strictly confined within the narrowest 
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.”106  Any desire to 
apply the privilege narrowly always must be considered in light of the 
counterweight of the general acceptance of the privilege.  The United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently addressed 
this tension in Louisiana Municipal Police Employees Retirement System 
v. Sealed Air Corp.:107 
 
While it is true that the attorney–client privilege is narrowly 
construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding process,” the 
privilege is not “disfavored.”  Courts should be cautious in their 
application of the privilege mindful that “it protects only those 
disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which 
might not have been made absent the privilege.”  In all 
instances, the facts underlying any given communication remain 
discoverable.108 
F.  The Certainty Imperative 
The attorney–client privilege can achieve its desired goals only if it is 
applied in an atmosphere of general certainty.  The privilege encourages 
a client to be completely honest and forthcoming with his or her lawyer 
only if the client can determine before the opportunity for 
 
is worthy of maximum legal protection.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Teleglobe 
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) (the privilege is not “disfavored”).  
106. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802–03 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Clarke v. 
Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because the attorney–client 
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it is applied 
only when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure by 
the client to his or her attorney.”); Harrisburg Auth. v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 380, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“‘It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are 
generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.’  The attorney client privilege is one 
such evidentiary privilege.” (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Transp. v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa. 
2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting))); Sieger v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 2009) (holding 
that the privilege “constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process,” and it therefore “must 
be narrowly construed, and its application must be consistent with the purposes underlying 
the immunity” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
107. 253 F.R.D. 300 (D.N.J. 2008). 
108. Id. at 305 (quoting, in order, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 
F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991); Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 361 n.13; Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). 
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communication that the privilege will protect the communication from 
court-ordered disclosure.  As the Supreme Court stated in Upjohn, 
 
[I]f the purpose of the attorney–client privilege is to be served, 
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree 
of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but 
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better 
than no privilege at all.109 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled against holdings that 
would injure the certainty of privilege, and the Court has heeded its own 
warning.  For example, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States,110 the Court 
considered application of the attorney–client privilege after the death of 
the client.111  The government argued that while the privilege might 
protect some information after the client’s death, the privilege should 
not protect communications containing extremely valuable 
information.112  The Court stated, “Balancing ex post the importance of 
the information against client interests, even limited to criminal cases, 
introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application.  For 
just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the 
contours of the privilege.”113 
  
 
109. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); see also Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp., 493 F.3d at 360 (“It is essential that parties be able to determine in advance with a high 
degree of certainty whether communications will be protected by the privilege.”); Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, 32 F.3d at 863 (“If we intend to serve the interests of justice by encouraging 
consultation with counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure, then courts must work to 
apply the privilege in ways that are predictable and certain.  ‘An uncertain privilege—or one 
which purports to be certain, but [results] in widely varying applications by the courts—is 
little better than no privilege.’” (quoting In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987))); 
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) (“Only if the client is 
assured that the information he relays in confidence, when seeking legal advice, will be 
immune from discovery will he be encouraged to disclose fully all relevant information to his 
attorney.”). 
110. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
111. Id. at 403. 
112. Id. at 406. 
113. Id. at 409; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996). 
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III.  THE ORIGINS OF RECOGNITION OF A PRIVILEGE IN THE ALLIED 
LAWYER SETTING 
A.  In the Beginning: The Chahoon Case 
The Virginia Supreme Court was the first court to apply a privilege 
to an allied lawyer situation.  In Chahoon v. Commonwealth, the court, 
in a criminal matter involving indicted defendants, held that the 
privilege applied to communications by a defendant to or in the 
presence of a lawyer for one of the other defendants.114 
In Chahoon, three men—Mr. Sanxay, Mr. Sands, and Mr. 
Chahoon—were indicted for a conspiracy to defraud the estate of 
Solomon Haunstein and for forging a note of Mr. Haunstein that was 
part of the conspiracy to defraud.115  All three men met after the 
indictment, along with Mr. Lyon, an attorney representing Mr. Sanxay, 
and Mr. Gregory, an attorney representing Mr. Sands.116  At Mr. 
Chahoon’s trial, Mr. Sanxay testified about what Mr. Chahoon had said 
at the meeting.117  Mr. Chahoon then sought to question Mr. Lyon about 
what Mr. Chahoon said at the meeting.118  But Mr. Lyon claimed that 
“all that passed [at the meeting,] . . . pass[ed] under the seal of 
professional confidence” and that he would not answer unless his client, 
Mr. Sanxay, consented.119  The trial court refused to force the lawyer to 
answer.120 
The Virginia Supreme Court began its discussion of the privilege by 
establishing the basic rule of privilege and quoting a treatise of the era 
as follows: “There is no rule of law better settled than ‘that a counsel, 
solicitor or attorney shall not be permitted to divulge any matter which 
has been communicated to him in professional confidence.’”121  The 
court then stated, “Now nothing can be more certain than that, 
according to all the authorities on the subject, whatever either of the 
counsel present heard, or saw, on the said occasion, concerning the 
 
114. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 843 (1871). 
115. Id. at 835.  See also Sands v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 871 (1872), for a 
related case dealing with the same facts. 
116. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 835. 




121. Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 395 (1826)). 
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matter of the said charge, was a privileged communication, within the 
meaning of the rule.”122 
By turning to the concept of joint clients, the Virginia Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion that the conversation was privileged.123  
The court noted that the law recognizes that a lawyer could represent 
two clients on a matter, and the court saw no difference in the situation 
before it.124  The court stated in reference to Mr. Lyon, Mr. Sanxay’s 
attorney, 
 
And can it make any difference in this case, that he was 
employed as counsel alone by Sanxay?  The parties were jointly 
indicted for a conspiracy to commit a particular crime, and 
severally indicted for forging and uttering the same paper.  They 
might have employed the same counsel, or they might have 
employed different counsel as they did.  But whether they did 
the one thing or the other, the effect is the same, as to their right 
of communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the 
privilege of such communication.125 
 
The court reinforced its conclusion that the allied lawyer situation 
before it was the same for purposes of the privilege by noting, “the 
counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, though, for purposes of 
convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client.”126  So 
in this court’s view, the attorneys present for the conversation 
represented all three indicted individuals for purposes of the privilege. 
Mr. Chahoon argued that Mr. Lyon’s client, Mr. Sanxay, waived the 
privilege by testifying about Mr. Chahoon’s statements in the group 
conversation.127  But the court stated that, in a joint client situation, the 
consent of all clients must be obtained before privileged 
communications lose their privileged status.128  If all of the parties had 
engaged Mr. Lyon as their attorney, all three parties would have to 
consent to disclosure for the privilege to be waived.129  Because the court 
 
122. Id. at 839–40. 
123. Id. at 843.  
124. Id. at 841. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 842. 
127. Id.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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viewed the situation before it as the same as a joint client situation, the 
same consent rule applied.  Mr. Sands never consented to any 
disclosure, so Mr. Sanxay’s actions in testifying could not waive the 
privilege.130  The court then concluded that the lawyer’s testimony was 
properly excluded, stating, “confidential communications from client to 
counsel, during the existence of this relationship, and about a 
professional matter, are privileged.”131 
In support of its holding, the court noted that “it was natural and 
reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the 
same crimes, should meet together in consultation with their counsel, 
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for them to 
know, and to make all necessary arrangements for the defence.”132  
Because the parties had a right to consult, the court concluded that the 
consultative communications must be privileged.133  The court stated, 
“Otherwise what would such right of consultation be worth?”134 
As the first case to recognize that communications in an allied 
lawyer situation can be privileged, this opinion must be analyzed 
carefully.  As precedent, the opinion withers under rational 
consideration. 
First is the fact that the lower court refused to allow the lawyer, Mr. 
Lyon, to testify, but the court allowed Mr. Sanxay to testify about the 
same conversation involving the defendants and the lawyers.  So, though 
the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s refusal to allow 
Mr. Lyons to testify, Mr. Sanxay’s testimony about the conversation was 
admitted and there was no reversal on this basis.  The court noted that, 
even if the lower court erred in finding Mr. Lyon’s probable testimony 
privileged, and thus even if the Virginia Supreme Court erred in 
affirming that finding, Mr. Chahoon was not prejudiced.135  So the 
Virginia Supreme Court seemed to say that, even if its holding was 
 
130. Id.  The court stated that even if Mr. Sanxay could waive the privilege’s protection, 
Mr. Sanxay’s testimony did not do that because it was at most a waiver by implication and an 
unclear implication at best.  The court stated, “An intention to release the privilege ought to 
be expressed; or, if implied, the implication ought to be plain.”  Id. at 843. 
131. Id. at 843. 
132. Id. at 839. 
133. Id. at 842. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 844.  The court noted that though Mr. Chahoon was found guilty, the term of 
imprisonment was the least available and he was recommended to the governor for executive 
clemency.  Id. 
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incorrect, it was of no import to the matter at hand.  Unfortunately, it 
has had import as precedent. 
Second, the court mischaracterized the law preceding its opinion.  
The court stated its conclusion that the privilege applied to the allied 
lawyer setting using the phrase, “nothing can be more certain,” and 
stating that all authorities agreed that the privilege applied to this 
situation.136  The Chahoon court cited no case law and, in fact, no one 
has discovered any case preceding Chahoon in which a court held that a 
communication in an allied lawyer situation was privileged. 
Third, the court’s analysis of the situation is flawed.  The court’s 
underlying assumptions about application of the attorney–client 
privilege to the joint client situation were correct.  The court’s error was 
its conclusion that the allied lawyer situation before it was the same as a 
joint client situation—that “the counsel of each was in effect the counsel 
of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid 
by his respective client.”137  Contrary to the Chahoon court’s statement, 
parties engage separate attorneys for reasons other than “purposes of 
convenience.”138  As the discussion in Part IV illustrates, the joint client 
situation and the allied lawyer situation are very different in very 
important ways, including justifying rationale and the nature of the 
relationships in each situation. 
Another flaw in the court’s analysis is the court’s leap from 
recognizing the parties’ desires to collaborate in their criminal defense 
to the conclusion that the system of justice must support or encourage 
that collaboration by recognizing a privilege for communications.  
Criminal defendants may have a right to consult with each other but it is 
quite a step to say that such defendants have a right to enjoy the 
protection of those consultations as privileged. 
The court’s motivation in finding that the privilege applied and that 
the attorney could not be compelled to testify may reflect the older view 
that the privilege belonged to the lawyer and protected the lawyer from 
testifying about client information learned in the lawyer-client 
relationship.139  This motivation is especially possible because the lower 
court allowed the testimony of Mr. Sanxay about the same conversation 
 
136. Id. at 839–40. 
137. Id. at 842. 
138. Id. 
139. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the older, abandoned view of the attorney–
client privilege. 
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involving the defendants and the attorneys.140 
B.  Historical Expansion of the Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Situation 
1. Schmitt v. Emery 
From 1871 until 1942, no published opinion from another United 
States court applied the privilege in an allied lawyer situation.141  In 1942 
in Schmitt v. Emery,142 the Minnesota Supreme Court enlarged 
application of the privilege beyond the bounds of Chahoon by applying 
it not in a criminal matter but in a civil matter, arising from an 
automobile collision.143  The Schmitt defendants included the owner and 
driver of a car, the driver of a bus, and the company that owned the 
bus.144  The plaintiff sought to have produced and admitted a document 
that reflected an interview between a claims employee of the bus 
company and the driver of the bus.145  The trial court directed the parties 
to argue the issue of admissibility, and so the bus company shared the 
report with the other defendants so that they could assist in preparing an 
argument for inadmissibility.146  The court ultimately excluded the 
document as privileged.147  On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
finding that the defendants were “maintaining substantially the same 
cause,” determined that disclosure of the document between counsel for 
 
140. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 835. 
141. A few courts considered applying the privilege but did not.  See, e.g., Smale v. 
United States, 3 F.2d 101, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1924).  Smale involved a conversation between two 
criminal defendants, both of whom had been indicted for obstruction of justice, and the 
lawyer for one of the defendants.  Id. at 101.  At trial the question was whether the lawyer 
could testify about the statements of the defendant who was not the lawyer’s client, Smale, or 
whether the conversation between the three was privileged.  Id.  The court did not apply the 
privilege to the statements of Smale because Smale did not engage the lawyer and gave no 
indication that he intended to engage the lawyer and because the lawyer did nothing to lead 
Smale to believe that he would “serve” Smale.  Id. at 102; see also Radio Corp. of Am. v. 
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (no privilege); State v. Hodgdon, 94 A. 
301, 302 (Vt. 1915) (no privilege for conversation between one defendant and that 
defendant’s lawyer and the lawyer for a co-defendant); Note, Waiver of Attorney–Client 
Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 1030, 1032–33 (1954) (no 
cases applying the privilege from 1871 to 1942). 
142. 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942). 
143. Id. at 414.  
144. Id. at 414–15.  
145. Id. at 415.  
146. Id.  
147. Id. 
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the defendants did not waive the privilege.148 
2. Continental Oil Company v. United States 
The next reported case applying the privilege to the allied lawyer 
setting occurred in 1964.  In Continental Oil Co. v. United States,149 not 
only did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apply the privilege in an 
allied lawyer situation, but it did so even though no formal legal 
proceedings involving the parties had begun.150  In contrast, in Chahoon, 
criminal defendants had been indicted at the time of the 
communications at issue, and in Schmitt, a suit was in progress before a 
court.  In Continental Oil Co., during grand jury proceedings and before 
any indictment, counsel for Standard Oil Company interviewed 
Standard employees and counsel for Continental Oil Company 
interviewed Continental employees.151  Then the respective attorneys 
prepared memoranda discussing the results of the interviews and 
exchanged the memos.152  The Continental Oil and Standard Oil 
attorneys claimed that the sharing was “to make their representation of 
their clients in connection with the Grand Jury investigation and any 
resulting litigation, more effective.”153  The plaintiff government 
subpoenaed the memos and claimed that when the attorneys shared the 
memos any attorney–client privilege was waived.154  The trial court 
refused to quash the government’s subpoenas.155  The appellate court 
disagreed, stating that the doctrine of Chahoon and Schmitt applied; the 
sharing of the memos did not act as a waiver of the privilege even 
though the communications occurred before an indictment or other 
formal proceeding.156  The court explained its decision by noting the 
value of the attorney–client privilege in general.157  The court did not 
address the fact that applying the attorney–client privilege in an allied 
 
148. Id. at 417. 
149. 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964). 
150. Id. at 348 (grand jury proceedings).   
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 348. 
153. Id. at 348–49. 
154. Id. at 349. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 349–50. 
157. Id. at 350 (“The privilege asserted here is a valuable and an important right for the 
protection of any client at any stage of his dealings with counsel.”). 
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lawyer situation was not a run-of-the-mill occurrence.158 
3. Hunydee v. United States 
Just one year later, in Hunydee v. United States,159 a federal court 
again applied the attorney–client privilege to an allied lawyer situation 
and expanded the scope of such an application.  In Hunydee, a husband 
was indicted for attempting to evade the payment of income tax.160  The 
wife was indicted for aiding in the preparation of false tax returns.161  At 
a meeting involving both defendants and their separate attorneys, Mr. 
Hunydee stated that he intended to “plead guilty and take the blame.”162  
At trial, both Mrs. Hunydee and her attorney testified about the 
communications that occurred at the meeting, including Mr. Hunydee’s 
statement.163  On appeal, Mr. Hunydee cited the Continental Oil decision 
and argued that the court should not have permitted Mrs. Hunydee or 
her attorney to testify about his statements because the attorney–client 
privilege protected his communications made at the meeting.164  The 
lower court had allowed the testimony because it believed that the 
attorney–client privilege did not apply because this was an allied lawyer 
situation and the communication did not involve “trial strategy or 
defenses.”165  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Continental Oil 
case did not involve “trial strategy or defenses” either166 and yet the 
privilege applied there.  The Hunydee court clarified that privileged 
communications do not lose their privileged status even though they are 
shared with another person and that person’s counsel if the statements 
“concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in 
possible subsequent proceedings.”167  The court concluded that the 
privilege protected Mr. Hunydee’s statements; neither Mrs. Hunydee 
nor her attorney could testify about them.168 
 
158. Perhaps the court was distracted by the argument of smaller detail about whether 
the privilege applied before an indictment or other formal procedure. 
159. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965). 
160. Id. at 184. 
161. Id.  
162. Id. 
163. Id.  
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 184–85. 
166. Id. at 185. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
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4. Summary 
The early acceptance and development of the doctrine applying the 
attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer setting was a bit stealthy.  
The initial acceptance of the application of the attorney–client privilege 
in the allied lawyer situation occurred in Chahoon in 1871, a criminal 
case involving post-indictment communications in which the evidence 
was admitted by way of another witness.169  The next three cases 
applying the privilege in the allied lawyer situation expanded the 
privilege to civil settings and to pre-litigation settings.170  Almost one 
hundred years passed between the Chahoon decision and the Hunydee 
decision.  None of the three post-Chahoon courts ever returned to the 
basic question of the propriety of applying the privilege in the allied 
lawyer situation.  These courts did not analyze whether applying the 
privilege in the allied lawyer situation furthered the goals of the 
attorney–client privilege.  Each court accepted the conclusion of the 
Chahoon court and assumed that the privilege survived disclosure in an 
allied lawyer situation.  Then each court dealt with smaller, subsidiary 
issues. 
C.  The Recent Explosion of Cases 
Courts in the last forty years, likewise, have accepted the general 
notion that the attorney–client privilege protects communications 
arising in an allied lawyer situation.  These courts have simply not 
looked back to analyze critically the Chahoon precedent.  The import of 
the error is magnified by the fact that courts are now bombarded by 
many more such claims.  No longer are courts dealing with one such 
claim now and then.  In the decade spanning 1970 to 1979, only five 
published cases involved claims of privilege in an allied lawyer setting.171  
In the decade spanning from 2000 to 2009, 168 published cases involved 
claims of attorney–client privilege based on some sort of common 
interest.172  The error of the Chahoon court in applying the attorney–
 
169. See supra Part III.A. 
170. See supra Parts III.B.1–.3. 
171. See supra note 1. 
172. See supra notes 1, 15.  Also see, for example, In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., in 
which the appellate court noted that lower court had incorrectly treated the situation as one 
involving allied lawyers when in reality it was a joint client representation setting.  493 F.3d 
345, 363–64 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007).  The appellate court referred to the joint client setting as 
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client privilege to the allied lawyer setting, originally an error of little 
import, now has tremendous impact on the doctrine of the attorney–
client privilege. 
IV.  THE JOINT CLIENT SETTING 
In giving birth to the idea that the attorney–client privilege should 
protect communications in the allied lawyer setting, the Virginia 
Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth analogized the allied 
lawyer situation to the joint client representation setting.173  The 
Chahoon court concluded that the two situations were the same in that a 
lawyer for one defendant “in effect” represented the other defendants 
present at a meeting at which the communications occurred.174  The 
Chahoon court then concluded that the privilege should apply to the 
allied lawyer situation as it would to a joint client representation 
situation.175  The analogy upon which the application of the attorney–
client privilege to the allied lawyer setting rests is a flawed analogy.  In 
reality, the joint client representation situation and the allied lawyer 
situation differ in very basic respects. 
A.  Joint Client Representation 
1. Defining Joint Client Representation 
Lawyers over the years have engaged in the practice of representing 
multiple clients with regard to the same matter.176  The clients must 
 
appropriate for the “co-client privilege” and referred to the allied lawyer setting as 
appropriate for the “community-of-interest privilege.”  Id. 
173. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (1871). 
174. Id. at 842. 
175. Id. at 843. 
176. See Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (discussing 
common joint representation scenarios of the time); Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A 
Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 394 (2001); Teresa Stanton 
Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REV. LITIG. 567, 574 (1997); see 
also Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts 
have long recognized the existence of the attorney–client relationship among clients and 
attorneys allied in a common legal cause.  Typically, parties jointly developing a patent with 
an attorney commonly have a ‘common legal interest’ in obtaining the greatest protection and 
in exploiting the patents.  The parties thereby develop a ‘community of interest,’ which 
establishes a joint attorney–client relationship among them and the attorney.  In this respect, 
when a community of interest exists, courts have viewed those represented as ‘joint clients’ 
for the purpose of privilege.” (quoting Hillerich & Bradsby v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 
126 (D.D.C. 1998))).  For early examples of accepted joint client representation, see Rice v. 
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impliedly or expressly agree to be represented by the lawyer and must 
agree to be a part of a common representation.177  The joint 
representation then consists only of the matters for which the clients 
have agreed upon for joint representation.178 
Often, when the question is whether there is a joint representation, 
the existence of representation itself is also at issue.179  A party may 
claim that the lawyer represented the party along with another party in a 
joint representation.  The lawyer may deny he or she represented the 
party at all, much less in a joint capacity.  The question of the joint 
nature of the representation often does not receive the courts’ attention 
because the courts often determine that there is no lawyer–client 
relationship of any kind.180  If there is no relationship, there is no need 
for courts to analyze whether a representation is joint or, rather, 
separate. 
An exception to these generalizations is Sky Valley Ltd. Partnership 
v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd.181  In that case, the defendants claimed that a 
law firm had represented them in addition to the plaintiffs as joint 
clients on a matter.182  The court determined that the lawyers in the firm 
and the defendants were not in an attorney–client relationship.183  
Though the court accepted that the defendants believed that the lawyers 
of the firm represented them, the court found such beliefs “clearly 
 
Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 336 (1854); Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 516–17 (1885); 
and Whiting v. Barney, 38 Barb. 393, 397 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862).  See generally 1 FRANCIS 
WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES § 587, at 561 
(1877) (“It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more persons address a lawyer as their 
common agent.”). 
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. c 
(2000) (discussing the creation of the joint client representation); id. § 14 (discussing the 
formation of the lawyer-client relationship). 
178. Id. § 75 cmt. c (“The scope of the co-client relationship is determined by the extent 
of the legal matter of common interest.”); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30.  
179. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 463 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Merck Eprova, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
180. See, e.g., MacKenzie–Childs LLC v. MacKenzie–Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241, 254–55 
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding no relationship); In re Colocotronis Tanker Secs. Litig., 449 F. 
Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he Court concludes that the banks were not actual clients 
of the firms.”). 
181. 150 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
182. Id. at 650.  The defendants claimed that they were joint clients so they could have 
access to certain communications.  
183. Id. 
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unreasonable.”184  Thus, the defendants were not clients of the lawyers of 
the firm.185 
The Sky Valley court had no need to analyze the possible joint 
nature of the relationship, but it did anyway.186  The court listed the 
following nonexclusive factors as relevant to the determination of joint 
representation:  
 
(1) the conduct of the two parties toward one another, (2) the 
terms of any contractual relationship (express or implied) that 
the two parties may have had, (3) any fiduciary or other special 
obligations that existed between them, (4) the communications 
between the two parties (directly or indirectly), (5) whether, to 
what extent, and with respect to which matters there was 
separate, private communication between either of them and the 
lawyer as to whom a “joint” relationship allegedly existed, (6) if 
there was any such separate, private communication between 
either party and the alleged joint counsel, whether the other 
party knew about it, and, if so, whether that party objected or 
 
184. Id. at 654.  The Sky Valley court stated the proper analysis for determining the 
existence of a relationship involved 
 
resolution of the dispute will turn on whether a contractual relationship was formed 
implicitly.  To answer that question, courts necessarily look to circumstantial 
evidence, taking into account all kinds of indirect evidence and contextual 
considerations that appear relevant to determining whether it would have been 
reasonable for the person to have inferred that she was the client of the lawyer.  
Thus, in this setting, whether the attorney–client relationship existed is a question of 
law that is resolved through an objective test.  
Id. at 652. 
185. Id. at 650.  In support of its finding that the defendants’ belief of representation was 
unreasonable, the court noted that the lawyers subjectively did not consider the defendants to 
be clients and never told anyone the firm represented the defendants.  Id. at 654.  At least one 
lawyer told several people, including a representative of the defendants, that the firm did not 
represent the defendants.  Id. at 655.  The defendants never paid the firm for services and the 
firm never billed the defendants for services.  Id.  The defendants received letters from the 
firm identifying the plaintiffs as clients but not identifying the defendants as clients.  Id.  Also, 
the defendants had separate counsel.  Id. at 655–56.  The court found that the defendants 
sought legal advice from the law firm and received legal advice from the law firm but only in 
the defendants’ contractual role as project manager, not individually.  Id. at 657.  The project 
contract required that the project manager consult with that law firm.  Id. at 656–57.  During 
the project the defendants also consulted a separate lawyer about the project.  Id. at 657.  The 
court concluded that “it would not advance the purposes of the privilege to hold that there 
was an attorney–client relationship between [the defendants] and [the law firm]” but might 
discourage communication by a party such as the plaintiffs.  Id. at 659. 
186. Id. at 661. 
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sought to learn the content of the private communication, (7) the 
nature and legitimacy of each party’s expectations about its 
ability to access communications between the other party and 
the allegedly joint counsel, (8) whether, to what extent, and with 
respect to which matters either or both of the alleged joint 
clients communicated privately with other lawyers, (9) the extent 
and character of any interests the two alleged joint parties may 
have had in common, and the relationship between common 
interests and communications with the alleged joint counsel, (10) 
actual and potential conflicts of interest between the two parties, 
especially as they might relate to matters with respect to which 
there appeared to be some commonality of interest between the 
parties, and (11) if disputes arose with third parties that related 
to matters the two parties had in common, whether the alleged 
joint counsel represented both parties with respect to those 
disputes or whether the two parties were separately 
represented.187 
2. Ethical Limits of Joint Representation 
Professional responsibility principles regarding concurrent conflicts 
of interest greatly inform any consideration of whether a joint client 
situation presents an appropriate commonality of interests to justify 
representation.  Specifically, Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct states: 
 
 (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent 
conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
 (1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or 
 (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
 
187. Id. at 652–63.  The Sky Valley court concluded that a belief in the existence of a 
joint client representation would have been unreasonable as well.  Id. at 659; see also Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Co. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In determining whether 
parties are ‘joint clients,’ courts may consider multiple factors, including but not limited to 
matters such as payment arrangements, allocation of decisionmaking roles, requests for 
advice, attendance at meetings, frequency and content of correspondence, and the like.”). 
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 (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
 (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be 
able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client; 
 (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
 (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a 
claim by one client against another client represented by the 
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal; and 
 (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed 
in writing.188 
 
The governing rule in most jurisdictions is this rule or a close 
approximation of it.189  The rule is aimed at insuring loyalty of the lawyer 
to the client, which includes insuring that the lawyer exercises 
independent judgment on behalf of each client in joint client settings 
and other settings.190 
With regard to a joint client representation, this rule allows a lawyer 
ethically to represent two or more clients at the same time, jointly or 
otherwise, if the clients will not be “directly adverse” and no “significant 
risk” exists that the representation of one of the clients will be 
“materially limited” by the lawyer’s responsibilities to one of the other 
joint clients.191  Even if one of these two conditions exists, the rule allows 
for a representation if the four conditions in Rule 1.7(b) are satisfied.192 
The shared information aspect of a joint client representation makes 
a lawyer’s representation of “directly adverse” clients impossible.193  
 
188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. 
189. The ABA has online charts for many states comparing the state rule to the Model 
Rule Charts for nineteen states state that the state rule is identical to the Model Rule.  Fifteen 
other state charts show that the state rule is substantially similar to the Model Rule.  States 
with identical rules are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont.  See Charts 
Comparing Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profession
al_responsibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1. 
191. See id. R. 1.7(a). 
192. See id. R. 1.7(b). 
193. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 19 (“For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in 
related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit 
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Real-world clients would never consent to such and a lawyer could 
never “reasonably believe[]” that, in such a situation, he or she could 
“provide competent and diligent representation” to each of the joint 
clients.  Indeed, the comments to Rule 1.7 note that “a lawyer cannot 
undertake common representation of clients where contentious 
litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or 
contemplated.”194 
There are many joint representation situations, however, in which 
there is a “significant risk” that the representation of one of the clients 
will be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s responsibilities to one of the 
other joint clients.  A lawyer wishing to jointly represent clients with 
such a risk must then “reasonably believe[] that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client.”195  In addition, the law must not prohibit the joint representation 
and the clients must give “informed consent, confirmed in writing.”196  
The comments to Rule 1.7 note that, 
 
because the lawyer is required to be impartial between 
commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients 
is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be 
maintained.  Generally, if the relationship between the parties 
has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients’ 
interests can be adequately served by common representation is 
not very good.  Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer 
subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis 
and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a 
relationship between the parties.197 
 
The comments specifically note that “[a] particularly important 
factor” in deciding whether a joint representation is appropriate is the 
ramifications for the duty of confidentiality and the attorney–client 
 
the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to 
consent.”).  
194. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 29. 
195. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1). 
196. Id. R. 1.7(b)(2), (b)(4).  The rule also prohibits a lawyer from suing a current client 
on behalf of another.  See id. R. 1.7(b)(3).  This situation is a subset of the set of situations in 
which the clients are “directly adverse.”  Id. R. 1.7(a)(1).  As established above, no joint 
representation is possible in any situation of direct adversity.  Id. 
197. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 29. 
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privilege.198  With regard to a lawyer obtaining consent from clients to a 
joint client representation and the sharing of information that such a 
representation necessarily entails, Comment 31 to Rule 1.7 provides: 
 
The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation 
and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed 
consent, advise each client that information will be shared and 
that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that 
some matter material to the representation should be kept from 
the other.199 
 
The lawyer must explain that his or her allegiance is to both clients; 
the lawyer cannot favor one joint client over another joint client.200  To 
obtain “informed consent,” the lawyer must obtain the potential joint 
clients’ agreement to the course of conduct after the lawyer explains to 
them “the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the 
proposed course of conduct.”201 
In addition, a joint client representation cannot occur if law prohibits 
it.  Comment 16 to Rule 1.7 notes that some states, for example, prohibit 
one lawyer from representing more than one defendant in a criminal 
matter involving the death penalty.202  Some jurisdictions have 
disapproved of joint representations that once were thought permissible.  
For example, some courts consider certain types of land transfers to be 
improper settings for joint representation.203  Yet, the representation of a 
 
198. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 30. 
199. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31.  Comment 31 continues,  
 
In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the 
representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the 
lawyer will keep certain information confidential.  For example, the lawyer may 
reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another 
client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the 
clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of 
both clients. 
Id. 
200. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 32. 
201. See id. R. 1.0(e).  
202. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 16. 
203. See, e.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 464–65 (N.J. 1993) (joint 
representation of buyer and seller in a complex commercial real estate transaction not 
allowed).  See generally Robert H. Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 814 
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buyer and a seller in a real estate transaction was once thought of as an 
acceptable and very common setting for a joint client representation.204 
Comment 29 to Rule 1.7 addresses the failure of a joint client 
representation by warning that “if the common representation fails . . . 
the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination.”205  
The lawyer “ordinarily” must withdraw from representation of all of the 
joint clients if an impermissible conflict arises.206  While joint 
representation has existed throughout the ages, it is a representation 
fraught with potential conflict-of-interest problems.  At least one 
commentator has argued that the practice should be abolished entirely 
because the risks far outweigh any benefits.207 
B.  Joint Client Representation and the Attorney–Client Privilege 
1. Generally 
The evidentiary principle of the attorney–client privilege 
traditionally has applied to the joint client representation group—the 
lawyer and the joint clients that the lawyer represents on the matter of 
common interest.208  These communications are confidential 
 
(1977) (“Dual representation is virtually always improper in transactions such as the sale of 
property because of the very high probability that future conflicts of interest will develop.”). 
Some states have disapproved of joint representation in uncontested divorce cases.  See, e.g., 
Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509 (W. Va. 1993) (“The likelihood of prejudice is so great 
with dual representation so as to make adequate representation of both spouses impossible, 
even where the separation is ‘friendly’ and the divorce uncontested.”).  See generally Mary E. 
Chesser, Joint Representation in a Friendly Divorce: Inherently Unethical?, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 
155 (2003).  
204. See Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935). 
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29. 
206. See id.  But see N.Y. State Bar Ass’n. Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 823, at 2–3, 5 
(2008) (stating that the lawyer must withdraw from representing one of the joint clients when 
the interests of the clients diverge but that the lawyer can continue to represent the other 
client if that client consents). 
207. See Bassett, supra note 176, at 458.  Bassett argues that a joint representation is a 
lesser representation because of the divided loyalty of the lawyer and that the client’s consent 
is “illusory protection.”  Id.  For further discussion of the costs and benefits of joint client 
representation, see Chesser, supra note 203, at 158–61; Collett, supra note 176, at 574–77; and 
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A 
Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 251–56 
(1982).   
208. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 287, 293 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[W]here 
two or more persons jointly consult an attorney concerning a mutual concern, their 
confidential communications with the attorney, although known to each other, will of course 
be privileged in the controversy of either or both of the clients with the outside world.” 
 
08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:05 PM 
520 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:475 
 
communications between lawyers and clients and, thus, are privileged.  
In effect, privilege law treats the joint clients as one client that is a group 
of individuals or entities.  With this view, the second or other joint 
clients are not third parties to the representation or the communication, 
and so the presence of the second or other joint clients does not destroy 
the confidentiality necessary for the privilege to attach as would occur if 
a third party is present for a communication involving a lawyer and a 
client.  Likewise, if a communication between a lawyer and a joint client 
is later shared with another joint client, the sharing does not waive the 
privilege as would occur if the communication were shared with a third 
party.209 
No one joint client can waive the privilege’s protection if the other 
joint clients do not consent.210  A slight caveat is that one joint client can 
 
(internal quotations omitted)); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 
F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“At its core, ‘[t]he “common interest” doctrine applies 
when multiple persons are represented by the same attorney.  In that situation, 
communications made to the shared attorney . . . remain privileged as to the rest of the 
world’” (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 
1992))). 
 This rule has been true for a very long time.  See Marcuse v. Kramer, 5 Teiss. 247, 250 (La. 
Ct. App. 1908) (“‘Two or more persons sometimes address a lawyer as a common agent.  So 
far as concerns strangers, these communications are privileged, but not as between 
themselves.  As they stand on the same footing as to the lawyer, either can compel him to 
testify against the other as to their negotiations.’” (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, A TREATISE 
ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW § 175 (2d ed. 1892))).  
209. In a traditional representation, the presence of a third party destroys any 
presumption of confidentiality necessary for the attorney–client privilege to attach. 
Disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication to a third party waives the privilege.  
See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) (“A communication is 
not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its 
attorney, or their agents are present.  Similarly, if a client shares an otherwise privileged 
communication with a third party, then the communication is no longer confidential and the 
client has waived the privilege.” (citation omitted)); see also supra Part II.D (for a discussion 
of the confidentiality requirement). 
210. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]aiving 
the joint-client privilege requires the consent of all joint clients.”); Robert Bosch LLC v. 
Pylon Mfg. Corp., 263 F.R.D. 142, 145 (D. Del. 2009) (“Waiver of the privilege requires the 
consent of all joint clients.”).  For an earlier statement, see Herman v. Schlesinger, 90 N.W. 
460, 463 (Wis. 1902) (“When an attorney’s services in a transaction are rendered to several 
persons, confidential communications to him in regard thereto, in which all such persons are 
interested, cannot be properly disclosed unless all join in consenting thereto.  The rule in that 
regard has been carried so far as to preclude an attorney from divulging matters 
confidentially communicated to him by a firm without the individual consent of every 
member thereof.  The reason for that is obvious.  The privilege of secrecy is purely a personal 
right.  When it affects several persons there is no way by which all can be protected in respect 
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reveal his or her communications with counsel, but only to the extent 
that the disclosure does not reveal any of the protected communications 
of the other joint clients.211  If the joint clients become adverse in a 
proceeding, however, the privilege does not protect any of the 
communications from the joint representation.212 
2. The Restatement Approach 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides 
separate sections for the joint client representation setting and the allied 
lawyer setting. Section 75 deals with the joint client representation 
setting, providing as follows: 
 
 (1) If two or more persons are jointly represented by the 
same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either co-client 
that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 and relates 
to matters of common interest is privileged as against third 
persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it has 
been waived by the client who made the communication. 
 (2) Unless the co-clients have agreed otherwise, a 
communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as 
between the co-clients in a subsequent adverse proceeding 
between them.213 
 
thereto other than by holding that all must join in lifting the veil of silence, or it must remain 
a secure cover for those things which it would obscure if they related to a single person only.” 
(citation omitted)); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30. 
211. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 363 (“[A] client may unilaterally waive 
the privilege as to its own communications with a joint attorney, so long as those 
communications concern only the waiving client; it may not, however, unilaterally waive the 
privilege as to any of the other joint clients’ communications or as to any of its 
communications that relate to other joint clients.”); Robert Bosch, 263 F.R.D. at 145–46 
(stating that, in a joint client situation, a co-client “may unilaterally waive the privilege 
regarding its communications with the joint attorney, but cannot unilaterally waive the 
privilege for the other joint clients or any communications that related to those clients”); Am. 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 573–74 (Ct. App. 1974). 
212. See Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(“Assuming the prior representation was joint, . . . neither of the parties to th[e] suit can 
assert the attorney–client privilege against the other as to matters comprehended by that joint 
representation.”); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (“[W]hen parties 
with a common interest retain a single attorney to represent them [and] . . . later become 
adverse, neither is permitted to assert the attorney–client privilege as to communications 
occurring during the period of common interest.”); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 72, § 5:19, at 568; RICE, supra note 19, § 4:33. 
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000).  
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This provision is an accurate description of how courts, in the years 
before the creation of the Restatement, applied the attorney–client 
privilege in the joint client setting. 
3. Historical Acceptance of Applying the Attorney–Client Privilege in 
the Joint Client Setting 
As the Virginia Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth 
correctly noted in 1871, historically the attorney–client privilege has 
protected communications in joint client settings.214  Early cases in the 
United States do not treat this application of the privilege as 
controversial.  Rather, it is treated as an accepted and indisputable point 
of law—an inherent side-effect of clients being clients as a group.  For 
example, in 1854, in Rice v. Rice, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
dealt with the question of whether a lawyer who had previously 
represented two people jointly could testify as to communications that 
occurred in the midst of the joint representation.215  The court stated, 
“As the communications were made to an attorney, who was acting at 
the time as the legal adviser of the parties, it is clear that he would not 
be permitted to disclose them in any controversy between them and a 
third person.”216  And in Whiting v. Barney,217 a New York court stated, 
“Unquestionably, the communication in this case was so far privileged 
as that the attorney would not be required or permitted to disclose it as 
a witness in favor of a third person, against both his clients, without their 
consent.”218 
 
214. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (1871) (“A man may be the counsel of two or more 
parties, concerning the same subject matter, and in all such cases confidential 
communications made to him by one or all of such parties, jointly or severally, in reference to 
such matter, are privileged.”). 
215. 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 335–36 (1854). 
216. Id. at 336.  Because the later matter was a controversy between the two formerly 
joint clients, the court allowed the testimony to be admitted.  Id. 
217. 38 Barb. 393 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862). 
218. Id. at 397; see also Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 517 (1885) (“Thus, Mr. 
Wharton says, vol. 1 § 587: ‘It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more persons 
address a lawyer as their common agent.  So far as concerns a stranger, their communication 
to the lawyer would be privileged.  It is otherwise, however, as to themselves; as they stand on 
the same footing as to the lawyer, either could compel him to testify against the other as to 
their negotiations.’” (quoting WHARTON, supra note 176, § 587)); Harris v. Daugherty, 11 
S.W. 921, 923 (Tex. 1889) (“The rule is that if the witness is the attorney of both parties in a 
transaction of this character, the communications made to him in course of the business are 
privileged, except in a controversy between the parties themselves.”). 
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Applying the attorney–client privilege to the joint client 
representation setting in the twenty-first century, therefore, is not an 
expansion of the application of the attorney–client privilege from its 
traditional metes and bounds of the 1800s.  Communications in the joint 
client situation that would have the benefit of privilege protection now 
would have had that same protection then. 
4. An Additional but Erroneous Requirement Resulting from the 
Confusion with the Allied Lawyer Setting 
Some courts have imposed an additional but erroneous requirement 
for application of the privilege in a joint client setting: proof of a 
common interest beyond that common interest inherent in a joint client 
representation.  For example, in Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, the court 
evaluated a claim of privilege in a situation in which two parties were 
represented by the same law firm with regard to claims of fraud against 
common adversaries.219  This was a joint client representation setting.  
The Dexia court began by noting 
 
[w]here two or more persons jointly consult an attorney 
concerning a mutual concern, “their confidential 
communications with the attorney, although known to each 
other, will of course be privileged in the controversy of either 
or both of the clients with the outside world . . . .” (citations 
omitted).  Moreover, the joint defense privilege cannot be 
waived without the consent of all parties to the defense, 
except in the situation where one of the joint defendants 
becomes an adverse party in a litigation.220 
 
This statement seems to accept the commonality of interest inherent 
in a joint client representation.  But the court continued by requiring the 
parties to make an additional proof—proof of a common interest that is 
more than simply proof of an interest sufficient for the creation of a 
joint client representation.  The Dexia court stated, 
 
 While often arising in the context of a joint defense, the 
common interest doctrine more generally applies to any parties 
 
219. 231 F.R.D. 268, 272–75 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
220. Id. at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 
90 F.R.D. 21, 29 (N.D. Ill. 1980)). 
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who have a “common interest” in current or potential litigation, 
either as actual or potential plaintiffs or defendants.  To 
maintain the privilege, the common interest must relate to a 
litigation interest, and not merely a common business interest.  If 
there is some or even substantial overlap between the litigation 
and business interests, the common interest doctrine still applies 
so long as a “community of interest” can be established with 
respect to the documents. . . . 
. . .  [T]he parties who assert a common interest as the basis for 
their assertion of privilege (where otherwise it would not exist 
due to the shared communications), must simply demonstrate 
“actual cooperation toward a common legal goal” with respect 
to the documents they seek to withhold.221 
 
In making these statements, the court did not rely upon cases 
involving joint client representation settings, but rather it relied upon 
cases involving parties with separate counsel—that is, cases in the allied 
lawyer setting.222 
Such an analysis that requires a showing beyond the presence of a 
joint client representation leaves open the possibility that a court would 
deny the privilege even when the purposes of the attorney–client 
privilege are otherwise present.  For example, the joint client 
representation might arise in a setting not involving litigation or its 
threat.  The Dexia court stated that “[t]o maintain the privilege, the 
common interest must relate to a litigation interest, and not merely a 
common business interest.”223  In such a situation the lawyer will have 
evaluated the positions of the clients and will have decided, in 
accordance with ethics concepts, that a joint representation would be 
ethical.  The interest of the clients would be “common” enough for a 
joint representation by one lawyer.  The clients would be seeking legal 
advice, just not advice regarding litigation.  Such a result would cause a 
denial of the privilege, a notion contrary to traditional understandings of 
privilege law in general and traditional applications of privilege law to 
the context of joint client representation. 
This expanded common interest requirement should not apply in the 
 
221. Id. (citations omitted). 
222. Id.  For example, the Dexia court relied on, in order, Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc. 
v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ill. 2001), Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), and United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir. 1997). 
223. Dexia, 231 F.R.D. at 273. 
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joint client representation setting.  The sharing of interest inherent in 
the ethical joint client representation should be all that is required for 
the privilege to apply.  A lawyer cannot represent more than one client 
on the same matter if there is an impermissible conflict of interest—the 
clients’ interests must align significantly.224  The stated requirement of a 
common interest is simply a statement of this reality of joint 
representation.  In the context of applying the attorney–client privilege 
to joint clients, the joint representation defines the requisite common 
interest.  There need be no independent analysis of common interest 
other than a determination that the communication is in furtherance of 
the joint representation—that is, intended to be a part of the joint client 
representation.  If the parties’ interests are aligned such that joint 
representation is desirable and ethical, the interests are sufficiently 
common. 
Before the explosion of allied lawyer setting privilege cases, courts 
applying the privilege in the joint representation setting seemed to 
understand this principle.  These courts did not mention a common 
interest; the joint client representation setting was sufficient proof of 
shared interest.225  The learned treatises of the time did not treat the 
presence of a common interest as an independent requirement for the 
application of the privilege.226  For example, the version of Wigmore’s 
treatise published in 1905 stated the following: 
 
 
224. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
225. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Comm’r, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942) (dealing with privilege 
issue in a joint client representation setting with no mention of common interest); Grand 
Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941) (considering privilege 
issue in a joint client representation setting without mention of common interest); Lew Moy 
v. United States, 237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916) (considering privilege issue in a joint client 
representation setting with no mention of common interest); see also Simpson v. Motorists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating that privilege applies when attorney 
represents two parties with a common interest, without discussing the common interest 
separately); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (same). 
226. See, e.g., WEEKS, supra note 208, § 175 (“Two or more persons sometimes address a 
lawyer as a common agent.  So far as concerns strangers, these communications are 
privileged, but not as between themselves.  As they stand on the same footing as to the 
lawyer, either can compel him to testify against the other as to their negotiations.”); 
WHARTON, supra note 176, § 587 (“It is easy to conceive of cases in which two or more 
persons address a lawyer as their common agent. So far as concerns a stranger, their 
communications to the lawyer would be privileged.  It is otherwise, however, as to 
themselves; and as they stand on the same footing as to the lawyer, either could compel him 
to testify against the other as to their negotiations.”). 
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 Communications to Opponent or His Attorney or in 
Opponent’s Presence; Joint Attorney.  There may be a relative, 
not an absolute, confidence.  The chief instance occurs when the 
same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and 
each party communicates with him.  Here the communications 
are clearly privileged from disclosure at the instance of a third 
person.  Yet they are not privileged in a controversy between the 
two original parties, inasmuch as the common interest and 
employment forbade concealment by either from the other.227 
 
Wigmore used the phrase, “common interest,” but not to add a 
requirement in addition to the necessity of a joint representation.  
Rather, the phrase, “common interest” explains when a representation 
is a joint representation as opposed to a lawyer representing two or 
more clients separately in a related matter.  A few early courts mention 
a shared interest, but use it in a definitional, descriptive fashion—more a 
method of describing the nature of a joint representation as opposed to 
a lawyer’s separate representation of two clients, not as an additional 
and separate requirement for application of the attorney–client 
privilege.228  If a lawyer represents one of the joint clients in a separate 
matter, communications relating to the separate matter would not be a 
part of the joint client representation and would not be treated as a 
communication in a joint client representation.229 
Some situations accentuate the historical lack of a common interest 
 
227. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 2312, at 3235 (1905).  
228. See, e.g., Croce v. Super. Ct., 68 P.2d 369, 370 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (“[T]he 
communications made by parties united in a common interest to their joint or common 
counsel, while privileged against strangers, are not privileged as between such parties nor as 
between their counsel and any of them, when later they assume adverse positions.”); 
Crawford v. Raible, 221 N.W. 474, 478 (Iowa 1928) (“[T]he testimony of an attorney as to a 
transaction in which two parties consult him, for their mutual benefit, is not privileged in an 
action between such parties or their representatives involving such transaction.”); Martin v. 
Slifkin, 293 N.Y.S. 213, 214 (App. Div. 1937) (“The testimony of the attorney who handled 
the transaction was properly admitted on the trial, as it was not privileged under section 353 
of the Civil Practice Act, for the reason that the parties on both sides consulted this witness 
for their mutual benefit.”). 
229. See, e.g., Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323 (LBS), 1988 WL 13746, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 1988) (“Simply because Rudow and LOPC were jointly represented in the Alvarez 
matter, does not permit Rudow access to every conceivable communication generated by 
Litton about Rudow during that period.  Clearly, in order to be discoverable under the joint 
client exception, the communication would have to relate to the subject matter of the joint 
representation.”); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:30. 
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requirement separate from the shared interest inherent in a joint client 
representation.  For example, if, after a joint client representation has 
begun, the interests of the joint clients diverge such that the joint 
representation is no longer ethically proper, courts have held that the 
privilege may still apply.230  At such a point of divergence, it is clear that 
there is insufficient shared interest even for a joint client representation 
much less for satisfying any additional common interest requirement.  
Yet, courts have applied the privilege.  In Federal Deposit Insurance Co. 
v. Ogden Corp., in an attempt to block disclosure of certain 
communications, the defendant claimed that though a joint client 
representation may have existed, the relationship dissolved when the 
defendant realized that its interests diverged from that of the other joint 
clients.231  Thus, communications after that divergence should not be 
accessible by the other joint clients.  The court stated, “A joint attorney–
client relationship remains intact until it is expressly terminated or until 
circumstances arise that readily imply to all the joint clients that the 
relationship is over.”232  Because the joint representation continued, any 
communications could not be kept from the other joint clients.233  
Clearly, in this court’s view, the determinative fact is the clients’ 
reasonable belief in the joint representation and not the lack of common 
interest at the time of the communications.  If the parties believe the 
joint representation has dissolved, then each can assert the privilege 
against the other with regard to communications after the dissolution 
even though the attorney may be acting unethically in continuing to 
represent both parties.234 
Unfortunately, the Dexia court’s approach of requiring a heightened 
proof of common interest in the joint representation setting is evidence 
that some courts have become confused about how to apply the 
attorney–client privilege in a joint client representation setting.  The 
 
230. See, e.g., Eureka Inv. Corp., N.V. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937–38 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (a lawyer’s improper behavior in not avoiding the conflict does not deprive the 
clients of the privilege); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:19, at 566.   
231. 202 F.3d 454, 462 (1st Cir. 2000). 
232. Id. at 463. 
233. Id. at 464. 
234. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d. 345, 368 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts 
are presented with a difficult problem when a joint attorney . . . continues representing both 
clients when their interests become adverse.  In this situation, the black-letter law is that when 
an attorney (improperly) represents two clients whose interests are adverse, the 
communications are privileged against each other notwithstanding the lawyer’s misconduct.” 
(citation omitted)).  
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confusion results from courts applying a common interest standard 
necessarily developed in allied lawyer settings to joint client 
representation settings.  Courts have become confused because they 
seem to believe that the doctrine that these courts often refer to as the 
common interest doctrine applies in the joint client representation 
scenario and in the allied lawyer scenario in exactly the same way.235  In 
fact, these two situations are not the same. 
In the joint client representation scenario, a heightened requirement 
of common interest is not necessary.  The common interest is inherent in 
the nature of the representation.  As long as the communication is in the 
context of the joint representation and as long as it satisfies the other 
elements of the attorney–client privilege,236 then the communication 
should enjoy the privilege.  The Washington Court of Appeals in 
Broyles v. Thurston County237 more appropriately deals with the 
application of the privilege in a joint client representation situation, in 
line with the historical precedent before the allied lawyer confusion.  In 
Broyles, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding of privilege 
and quoted the trial court as follows: 
 
It’s clear to me that all of the people went to see . . . [the] 
attorneys to get legal advice about their situation at work.  They 
went as a group.  An attorney/client relationship resulted from 
that meeting when they went to get legal advice about their 
situation at work. . . .  That’s the consequence of going to see 
attorneys in a confidential situation and asking them questions. 
Going as a group with a common problem, statements of all are 
protected.  And no one individual at that meeting can waive 
privilege for all.  And so I believe that the attorney/client 
privilege prevailed at that meeting and should be honored.238 
 
This is the simple and correct approach to applying the attorney–
client privilege in a joint client representation setting. 
 
235. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Ill 2004).  See 
discussion of Dexia supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra notes 60–64 for a breakdown of the elements needed for attorney–client 
privilege. 
237. 195 P.3d 985 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
238. Id. at 1002. 
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5. The Peculiar Confusion of Joint Clients in the Entity Environment 
The application of the attorney–client privilege to the joint client 
representation setting also has suffered a bit of confusion as a result of 
some courts’ skepticism of claims arising in entity representation.  Entity 
employees sometimes claim that attorneys representing the entity also 
represent the individual employees, separately or jointly.239  Because the 
test of representation is the honest and reasonable belief of the person 
in the position of client,240 it is certainly possible that an employee might 
honestly and reasonably believe that he or she is represented by the 
entity attorney depending on what the attorney says when dealing with 
the individual, what the individual communicates to the attorney, and 
other circumstances of the situation.241  If the individual has this honest 
and reasonable belief, the attorney–client privilege may apply to 
communications within that attorney–client relationship, provided the 
other elements required to protect the privilege also are present (i.e., 
the communications are for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and 
are confidential and not in furtherance of a crime or fraud). 
Some courts have not applied the honest and reasonable belief 
 
239. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571–72 (1st Cir. 2001); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 658–59 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997); 
In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123–26 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Tuttle v. Combined Ins. Co., 222 F.R.D. 424, 428–30 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Grassmueck v. Ogden 
Murphy Wallace, P.L.L.C., 213 F.R.D. 567, 571–72 (W.D. Wash. 2003).  
240. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 
(D. Del. 2009) (“Under Delaware law, where there is no express contract or formal retainer 
agreement evidencing an attorney–client relationship, ‘courts look at the contacts between 
the potential clients and its potential lawyers to determine whether it would have been 
reasonable for the “client” to believe that the attorney was acting on its behalf as counsel.’” 
(quoting Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. C.A. 19719-NC, 2002 WL 
31057462, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2002))); NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312 
(D.D.C. 2009) (“[I]t is well settled that ‘the relationship between attorney and client hinges 
on the client’s intention to seek legal advice and his belief that he is consulting an attorney.’  
Thus, to determine whether there is an attorney–client relationship here, I must determine 
whether the Union ‘believed [it] was seeking advice and whether [the Union’s] belief about 
the confidentiality of the conversation was reasonable.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Jones v. United States, 828 A.2d 169, 176 (D.C. 2003))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000) (discussing the requirements for the formation 
of an attorney–client relationship). 
241. See Sky Valley Ltd. P’ship v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 150 F.R.D. 648, 651 (N.D. Cal. 
1993) (“[T]he courts have focused on whether it would have been reasonable, taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances, for the person who attempted to invoke the joint client 
exception to have inferred that she was in fact a ‘client’ of the lawyer.”). 
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standard, however.  They require that the individual, to succeed on a 
claim of privilege, make proofs beyond those in other attorney–client 
privilege settings.242  These courts value the rights of the corporation 
with regard to the attorney–client privilege over the rights of the 
individual.  Yet, no valid policy justifies derogation of the rights of the 
individual for the benefit of the entity.  In addition, such a position is in 
contravention of ethics principles governing attorney conduct.243  Such a 
stance is misguided.244 
If the circumstances of the situation show that the attorney, the 
entity, and the individual are involved in a joint representation, then the 
attorney–client privilege should apply to communications within that 
relationship if the required elements of the attorney–client privilege are 
satisfied.  The individual must prove, however, the joint nature of the 
representation.  There is no valid policy justification for applying a 
different rule to the entity situation.  
 
242. See, e.g., Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123 (noting that for the recognition of individual 
attorney–client privilege, the individual must prove that the individual “‘approached [counsel] 
for the purpose of seeking legal advice,’” that the individual was clear with counsel that he or 
she sought legal advice in his or her individual capacity, that the lawyer communicated with 
the individual in his or her individual capacity even with the possibility of a conflict of interest 
on the horizon, that the communications were confidential, and that the communications “did 
not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company” (quoting In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983))); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 
F.3d at 215 (rejecting honest and reasonable belief standard and discussing Bevill 
approvingly); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 572 (applying Bevill factors but noting 
that an individual privilege could be claimed even when a consultation involved the “general 
affairs” of the corporation if the focus of the consultation was with regard to the “‘individual 
officer’s personal rights and liabilities’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038, 
1041 (10th Cir. 1998))).  
243. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (“In dealing with an 
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a 
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the 
lawyer is dealing.”); see also id. R. 4.3 (directing a lawyer, in the course of a representation 
who is dealing with unrepresented parties, not to imply disinterestedness and to correct 
misunderstandings about the lawyer’s role). 
244. See Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney–Client Privilege, and 
Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109 (2010) (discussing 
the possibility of the existence of an attorney–client relationship and application of the 
attorney–client privilege in such an entity setting). 
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V.  THE ALLIED LAWYER SETTING AND THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
In contrast to communications that occur in the joint client 
representation situation, communications in the allied lawyer setting 
should not have the benefit of the privilege. 
A.  Current Application of the Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Setting 
First applied in Chahoon v. Commonwealth245 as a privilege 
applicable only in allied lawyer settings involving criminal matters in 
reference to a joint defense,246 courts now apply the privilege in both 
criminal and civil settings.247  While some courts require that litigation be 
on the horizon,248 others apply the privilege even in transactional 
 
245. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871). 
246. Chahoon involved jointly indicted defendants in a criminal matter.  See id. at 835; 
supra discussion Part III.A. 
247. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating 
that, in a criminal matter, the privilege could have applied if the interests of the parties were 
aligned and they had agreed to work together); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, 692 
S.E.2d 526, 530 (S.C. 2010) (privilege may apply to communications between South Carolina 
Attorney General and the National Association of Attorneys General about issues following 
from implementation of national tobacco litigation settlement agreement).  For a discussion 
of the application of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting and in the criminal context, see 
Lerner, supra note 6.  For a discussion of the parameters of the privilege as applied to the 
allied lawyer setting, see Nicole Garsombke, Note, A Tragedy of the Common: The Common 
Interest Rule, Its Common Misuses, and an Uncommon Solution, 40 GA. L. REV. 615 (2006).  
See generally Bartel, supra note 6; Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why 
the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 49 (2005) [hereinafter Schaffzin, Common Interest]; Susan K. Rushing, Note, 
Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the Attorney–Client Privilege, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
1273 (1990).  For a discussion of ethical and malpractice issues surrounding the privilege, see 
George S. Mahaffey, Jr., All for One and One for All?  Legal Malpractice Arising from Joint 
Defense Consortiums and Agreements, The Final Frontier in Professional Liability, 35 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 21 (2003); Todd M. Sahner, Running the Ethical Obstacle Course: Joint Defense 
Agreements, 28 STETSON L. REV. 339 (1998); Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, Eyes Wide Shut: 
How Ignorance of the Common Interest Doctrine Can Compromise Informed Consent, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 71 (2008); Amy Foote, Note, Joint Defense Agreements in Criminal 
Prosecutions: Tactical and Ethical Implications, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 377 (1999); 
Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar 
Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1994).  
248. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding the 
threat of litigation necessary); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(“palpable threat of litigation” required); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 
383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (requiring an agreement to “share information as a result of a 
common legal interest relating to ongoing or contemplated litigation”).  See generally 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at n.7. 
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contexts.249  The claimers of the privilege need not be defendants, as the 
claimers were in Chahoon.250  They can be plaintiffs.251  Although the 
privilege appears to be an especially popular claim in patent and 
trademark matters,252 it is claimed in all sorts of contexts.253 
Some courts may require both parties to the communication to be 
attorneys.254  Other courts seem to require that at least one attorney be 
involved for the communication to be privileged.255  In contrast, some 
courts do not require the presence of an attorney for the privilege to 
apply to communications in the allied lawyer context.256 
All courts require the parties claiming the privilege in the allied 
 
249. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It applies in 
civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”). 
250. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871); see also supra discussion Part III.A. 
251. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990); United 
States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002)  (“‘[W]hether the jointly 
interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs . . . the rationale for the joint defense rule 
remains unchanged.’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249)); Sedlacek v. 
Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“In order to 
ensure that inequities in discovery are not established in cooperating defendants’ favor, it is 
necessary to extend the common interest rule to cooperating plaintiffs.”). 
252. See, e.g., B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 729, 734–35 (1998) 
(holding that the privilege applied, in a patent infringement action against the government, to 
communications involving a contractor who was not a defendant); Leader Techs., Inc. v. 
Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (privilege claimed in dispute between 
patentee and a litigation financing company but court did not find a common interest); In re 
Smirman, 267 F.R.D. 221, 222–23 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (privilege applied in a patent 
infringement action). 
253. See, e.g., Fojtasek v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 650, 652, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(action claiming cruise line negligence caused the death of a passenger); Duke Energy, 214 
F.R.D. at 384 (action to enforce the Clean Air Act). 
254. See, e.g., Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 365 (“The attorney-sharing 
requirement helps prevent abuse by ensuring that the common-interest privilege only 
supplants the disclosure rule when attorneys, not clients, decide to share information in order 
to coordinate legal strategies.”).  
255. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The 
defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations 
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of 
those conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is 
rejected.”); Harper-Wyman Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 86 C 9595, 1991 WL 62510, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1991) (“This is problematical, as communications between joint 
plaintiffs or joint defendants outside of counsel’s presence are not protected under the joint 
defense theory.”). 
256. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ 6820(RMB)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (“If information that is otherwise privileged is shared between 
parties that have a common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no 
attorney either creates or receives that communication.”); see also discussion infra Part V.F.4. 
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lawyer setting to prove the existence of a common interest that the 
communication furthers.257  Though an acceptable common interest is a 
more limited level of interest than in the joint client representation 
setting,258 there is no agreement as to the appropriate level of common 
interest required.259 
Courts also disagree about the required level of intention to 
cooperate.  Some courts require proof of an intention to cooperate260 
while other courts seem to assume an intention to cooperate simply by 
the fact of the communication.261 
If a court determines that the attorney–client privilege applies in an 
allied lawyer setting, courts agree that the privilege cannot be waived 
without the consent of all parties in the allied lawyer shared interest 
group.262  If the parties become embroiled in a matter in an adversarial 
posture, courts do not apply the privilege between the formerly 
cooperating parties.263 
B.  The Restatement Approach 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section 
76, entitled “The Privilege In Common–Interest Arrangements,” 
 
257. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 364; see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35. 
258. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the common interest inherent in a joint 
client representation.  With regard to the allied lawyer setting, Mueller and Kirkpatrick state, 
“[E]ach client has her own lawyer, and it is understood that their common interest is limited 
and they are already (or potentially) adversaries on other related matters, in a situation in 
which a single lawyer could not properly represent both.”  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 72, § 5:20, at 571. 
259. See discussion infra Part V.G.1; see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36 (“There is no 
clear standard for measuring the community of interests that must exist for the privilege to 
apply.”). 
260. See, e.g., Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 285 (4th Cir. 
2010) (stating, in referring to an agreement to collaborate, “While agreement need not 
assume a particular form, an agreement there must be”). 
261. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (no mention of 
any agreement); see also discussion infra Part V.F.2. 
262. See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35 (stating “individual participants in the joint defense 
arrangement generally cannot unilaterally waive the privilege protection”); see also Wagar v. 
Gamache, No.1:06-MC-127(LEK/RFT), 2006 WL 3699544, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2006) 
(stating “the essential benefit of such joint collaboration is that a member of the common 
legal enterprise cannot reveal the contents of the shared communications without the consent 
of all the parties” (citation omitted)). 
263. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 
RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35. 
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provides a definition of the situation in which the privilege applies.264 
Section 76 states, 
 
 (1) If two or more clients with a common interest in a 
litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate 
lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the 
matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise 
qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is 
privileged as against third persons.  Any such client may invoke 
the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made 
the communication. 
 (2) Unless the clients have agreed otherwise, a 
communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as 
between clients described in Subsection (1) in a subsequent 
adverse proceeding between them.265 
 
One of the great benefits of this section of the Restatement is that, in 
combination with section 75 (which deals with the joint client 
representation setting),266 it attempts to separate the allied lawyer and 
joint client representation situations.  This is an improvement on the 
present state of affairs in the courts since many courts do not distinguish 
the two settings and attempt to treat the two situations identically.267 
Section 76 treats the allied lawyer situation very similarly to the joint 
client representation setting, however.  The privilege applies if the 
parties agree to exchange information,268 if the parties have a “common 
interest,” and if all parties agree to a waiver for disclosure to occur.  A 
party can waive the privilege protection with regard to his or her own 
statements but only to the extent that communication does not reveal 
 
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (2000). 
265. Id. 
266. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
267. In discussing the confusion of the joint client representation setting and the allied 
lawyer setting, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., noted 
that the matter before it involved parties with a common attorney and so the trial court had 
erred in ruling that the parties were “in a ‘community of interest.’”  493 F.3d at 363 n.18.  The 
court continued, “Indeed, much of the caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege 
(which is the same as the ‘common interest privilege’) with the co-client privilege.”  Id. 
(citation omitted); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.4. 
268. Comment c to section 76 of the Restatement clarifies that a formal agreement is not 
required.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. c. 
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protected communications of others.269  As with the situation of joint 
clients, there is no privilege between these parties in later adversarial 
matters with regard to communications involving the matter of common 
interest.270  In disagreement with some courts, the Restatement requires 
that the communication involve a lawyer; a communication between 
clients without a lawyer present cannot be privileged.271 
In an attempt to define what is a “common interest” in the allied 
lawyer setting, the Restatement explains, “The communication must 
relate to the common interest, which may be either legal, factual, or 
strategic in character.  The interests of the separately represented clients 
need not be entirely congruent.”272  Thus, the Restatement definition of 
common interest is broad, which is in contrast to the view of some 
courts.273 
Unfortunately, the Restatement uses the phrase “common interest” 
to describe the interest in a joint client representation setting and also to 
describe the interest that parties must share in an allied lawyer 
situation.274  One might, therefore, assume that the same level of 
“common interest” is required in both settings.  Yet, the reality is that 
the shared interest necessary for a joint client representation to occur is 
more aligned than is true in many, if not all, allied lawyer situations.  
The common interest present with joint clients must be close to identical 
because otherwise the attorney cannot ethically handle a joint 
representation.275  This certainly cannot be said regarding the allied 
 
269. See id. § 76 cmt. g (“[A]ny member may waive the privilege with respect to that 
person’s own communications. . . .  If a document or other recording embodies 
communications from two or more members, a waiver is effective only if concurred in by all 
members whose communications are involved, unless an objecting member’s communication 
can be redacted.”). 
270. See id. §§ 76(2), 76 cmt. f. 
271. See id. § 76 cmt. d. 
272. Id. § 76 cmt. e. 
273. See discussion infra Part V.F.1. 
274. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1) 
(“If two or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a 
communication of either co-client that . . . relates to matters of common interest is privileged 
as against third persons.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 76(1) (“If two or more clients with a 
common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and 
they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such 
client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is 
privileged as against third persons.” (emphasis added)). 
275. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2; see also In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 
F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “common interest” in the joint representation 
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lawyer context.  As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in In re 
Teleglobe Communications Corp. regarding the allied lawyer context, 
“because the clients have separate attorneys, courts can afford to relax 
the degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying 
that their attorneys’ ability to represent them zealously and single-
mindedly will suffer.”276 
C.  The Representational Posture 
1. Lack of an Attorney–Client Relationship Under the Traditional 
Approach for Recognition of a Relationship 
Applying the privilege to communications in the allied lawyer setting 
greatly increases the wingspan of privilege protection in a way that does 
not occur in the joint client representation setting.  In a joint client 
setting, all privileged communications are between an attorney and his 
or her clients.  This is not true in the allied lawyer setting. 
The Virginia Supreme Court in Chahoon v. Commonwealth277 
viewed each attorney present for the key communications with the 
defendants as representing all three defendants even though each 
defendant had engaged a separate attorney.278  In fact, the attorney 
engaged by the defendant whose communications were at issue was not 
present.  The court stated that “the counsel of each was in effect the 
counsel of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed 
and paid by his respective client.”279 
The Chahoon court erred in such a conclusion.  A lawyer in an allied 
lawyer setting represents and therefore has an attorney–client 
relationship with only those persons who honestly and reasonably 
believe they are represented by that lawyer.280  The traditional test used 
 
scenario means “legal interests must be identical (or nearly so) in order that an attorney can 
represent them all with the candor, vigor, and loyalty that our ethics require”); Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Co. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The term ‘common interest’ 
typically entails an identical (or nearly identical) legal interest as opposed to a merely similar 
interest.”). 
276. 493 F.3d at 366. 
277. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871). 
278. Id. at 842.  
279. Id. 
280. See Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“‘The formation of an attorney–client relationship hinges upon the client’s [reasonable] 
belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek 
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by courts in all sorts of settings for the determination of the existence of 
an attorney–client relationship has long been the honest and reasonable 
belief of the person in the position of client.281  This is supported by the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which states in 
Section 14 that 
 
 A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: 
 (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the 
lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either 
 (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or 
 (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, 
and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the 
services; or 
 (2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to 
provide the services.282 
 
While courts generally do not require an express agreement,283 courts 
are very likely to find an attorney–client relationship if such an 
agreement exists.284  In contrast, in the allied lawyer setting there may be 
 
professional legal advice.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Diversified Grp., Inc. v. 
Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))). 
281. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D. 
Del. 2009) (“Under Delaware law, where there is no express contract or formal retainer 
agreement evidencing an attorney–client relationship, ‘courts look at the contacts between 
the potential clients and its potential lawyers to determine whether it would have been 
reasonable for the “client” to believe that the attorney was acting on its behalf as counsel.’” 
(quoting Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. C.A. 19719-NC, 2002 WL 
31057462, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2002))); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 946 A.2d 
500, 521 (Md. 2008) (“Rather, ‘[t]he relationship may arise by implication from a client’s 
reasonable expectation of legal representation and the attorney’s failure to dispel those 
expectations.’” (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (Md. 
2003))); John V. Heutsche Co. L.P.A. v. McNea, 905 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2008) 
(“Whether or not an attorney–client relationship was created ‘turns largely on the reasonable 
belief of the prospective client.’” (quoting Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 798 
N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ohio 2003))).  See generally Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney–Client 
Relationship: Exploring the Unintended Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 269 (2009). 
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000). 
283. See, e.g., Tinn v. EMM Labs, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (D. Or. 2008) 
(recognizing that no express written or oral contract is necessary); Smith v. State, 905 A.2d 
315, 325–26 (Md. 2006) (noting that no express agreement is necessary). 
284. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004–06 
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (noting that engagement agreement said law firm represented a 
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an express agreement that no lawyer in the arrangement represents any 
client other than the one he or she represents separately.285  If there is 
such an agreement, the members of the joint effort cannot argue 
successfully that they honestly and reasonably believe that they are 
represented not only by their individually selected separate attorneys 
but also the attorneys separately engaged by other members of the joint 
effort. 
Other circumstances, such as statements by a lawyer that he or she 
represents members of the group other than his or her separate client, 
could create an honest and reasonable belief on the part of those 
members of the group that the attorney represents the other members 
of the group.  Likewise, the fact that a lawyer renders individual legal 
advice to a member of the group other than his or her separate client 
could create in that member an honest and reasonable belief in 
representation and thus in the existence of an attorney–client 
 
corporation “and its affiliates” and so the affiliate’s claim of representation was reasonable); 
see also Johnson v. Schultz, 671 S.E.2d 559, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 691 S.E.2d 701 
(N.C. 2010) (“‘[T]he relation of attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the 
parties, and is not dependent on the payment of a fee, nor upon the execution of a formal 
contract.’” (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985))). 
285. For example, ABA Formal Opinion 95-395 notes that the joint defense consortium 
agreement being considered there stated that the lawyers for the separate members of the 
consortium did not represent any other members of the consortium.  ABA Comm. on Ethics 
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995).  Alan Kornberg provided a sample 
published provision of such an agreement: 
 
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to create an attorney–client relationship 
between Law Firm 1 (counsel to Creditor 1) and Creditor 2, or between Law Firm 2 
(counsel to Creditor 2) and Creditor 1, or to affect the separate and independent 
representation of each Party by its respective counsel according to what such 
counsel believes to be in his or her client’s best interest.  After full opportunity to 
advise and confer with their respective counsel, each of the Parties represent that 
each waives any right to seek disqualification of the other Party’s counsel in any 
matter now pending or hereinafter commenced, based on such counsel’s receipt or 
disclosure of Confidential Information pursuant to this Agreement, nor shall any 
counsel to a Party be disqualified from examining or cross-examining any other 
Party who testifies in any proceeding (now pending or hereinafter commenced) 
because of such Party’s participation in this Agreement or because such counsel 
may subsequently execute an amendment to this Agreement in accordance with 
Section 12. 
Alan W. Kornberg, Sample Common Interest and Confidentiality Agreement, in RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRESSED DEBT, RESTRUCTURINGS AND WORKOUTS—FALLOUT 
FROM THE CREDIT CRUNCH 2008, at 81, 86–87 (2008); see also 1 JOEL M. ANDROPHY, 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 3:60 (2d ed. 2011) (sample joint defense agreement containing a 
provision denying the existence of an attorney–client relationship). 
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relationship and all its burdens and benefits.286  In the typical allied 
lawyer situation, an attorney for one member of the group does not 
make statements or behave in a manner that would cause other 
members of the group to have an honest and reasonable belief that the 
attorney represents not only his or her separate client, but also other 
members of the group.  This is especially true if the group members 
have an agreement which states that each lawyer involved represents 
only that lawyer’s separate client. 
In contrast, conflicts of interest of various sorts and degrees are 
common in allied lawyer settings.287  Frequently, the conflicts are such 
that no one attorney could ethically represent more than one member of 
the joint effort—hence the use of separate lawyers.  Such conflicts, if 
sufficiently obvious, are an indication that no person in the joint effort 
can have an honest and reasonable belief of an attorney–client 
relationship with an attorney separately representing another party in 
the joint effort.288 
The result of the proper application of this law regarding the 
formation of the attorney–client relationship is that a lawyer does not 
represent all parties in a cooperative group simply by virtue of their 
membership in the cooperative group.  A lawyer does not have, by 
virtue of the cooperation, an attorney–client relationship with parties in 
a cooperative group.  A lawyer involved in an allied lawyer setting may 
 
286. A person paying a lawyer for his or her services has a stronger argument that he or 
she honestly and reasonably believed that the attorney represented the person and thus that 
they were in an attorney–client relationship.  An attorney–client relationship can be formed 
and recognized, however, without payment.  See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1978) (a professional relationship does not depend on the 
payment of fees); Tinn, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (same); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Shoup, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (Md. 2009) (“Our cases make clear that an explicit agreement or 
payment arrangement is not a prerequisite to the formation of an attorney–client 
relationship.”). 
287. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 575, 579 
(D. Colo. 2007) (“Even if there is adversity between some of the parties to the common 
interest agreement, they still may invoke the joint defense privilege to protect 
communications from disclosure to third parties.”); see also JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., 
CORPORATE PRIVILEGES & CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 4.02(3)(a) (2010) (discussing 
the probability of adverse interests in the allied lawyer setting). 
288. The court in Harry A. v. Duncan stated, “‘Where appropriate, due consideration 
should be given to the unreasonableness of a claimed expectation of entering a [sic] into a co-
client status when a significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the 
organization or other client and the associated person or entity claimed to be a co-client.’”  
330 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (D. Mont. 2004) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (2000)). 
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owe other, nonclient parties in the group fiduciary duties that may flow 
from the joint effort and sharing of information, but the attorney does 
not have a true attorney–client relationship with those parties absent 
other conduct creating an honest and reasonable belief of an attorney–
client relationship.289 
At all times in the allied lawyer situation, such an attorney focuses 
on maximizing the ultimate outcome for his or her separate client.  One 
can say that the attorney is acting in the best interest of all members of 
the joint effort, but such an attorney, at any particular point in the joint 
effort, is always evaluating the situation to determine whether the joint 
effort is in the best interest of his or her own client.  When the better 
course is for the individual member to exit the joint effort, the lawyer 
will so counsel his or her client.  So even in the midst of the joint effort, 
a lawyer for any one member of the joint effort has one eye clearly 
focused on the individual interests of the attorney’s separate client. 
2. ABA Formal Opinion 95-395: No Attorney–Client Relationship 
In ABA Formal Opinion 95-395,290 the American Bar Association’s 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
considered the nature of the relationship of an attorney and members of 
a joint defense consortium, an allied lawyer setting.291  While speculating 
that an attorney in an allied lawyer situation may owe members of the 
group fiduciary duties, the Opinion does not view the other members of 
the group as clients of the lawyer.292  Consistent with recognizing the 
absence of an attorney–client relationship, the Opinion clearly states 
that the lawyer owes no ethical duties to the members of the group 
other than the lawyer’s separate client.293 
The Opinion discusses these matters while focusing on the question 
of possible conflicts of interest created by the joint consortium with 
regard to a lawyer who no longer represents any member of the group.294  
First, the Opinion addresses obligations the lawyer might have as a 
 
289. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 1 (1995); 
see also United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (stating a 
search of cases did not recognize that joint defense agreement created “a true attorney–client 
relationship or a general duty of loyalty”). 
290. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395. 
291. See id. at 1. 
292. See id. at 5. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. at 2. 
08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:05 PM 
2011–2012] END THE EXPERIMENT 541 
 
result of his duties to his former separate client.295  The Opinion states 
that a lawyer who has confidential information from members of the 
consortium other than his separate client “might owe an obligation to 
his former client not to disclose the information by reason of the former 
client’s obligation to the other members.”296  If the former client 
consented to disclosure, the “[l]awyer would almost surely have a 
fiduciary obligation to the other members of the consortium, which 
might well lead to his disqualification.”297  The lawyer’s fiduciary 
obligation, in the view of the ABA Committee, arises from the law of 
agency.298  The lawyer’s client might be viewed as an agent of the other 
members of the consortium and the lawyer, when he came upon the 
information, was a “sub-agent” of the lawyer’s client.299  The lawyer’s 
obligation to protect the information of the nonclient consortium 
member thus would be derivative of the client’s obligation to that 
member.300  The ABA Opinion clarifies, however, that the lawyer 
“would not, however, owe an ethical obligation” to the other members 
of the consortium “for there is simply no provision of the Model Rules 
imposing such an obligation.”301 
 
295. See id. 
296. Id. at 4. 
297. Id. at 5.  The Opinion cites Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977), in which co-defendants of an attorney’s client in a prior 
matter sought to have the attorney disqualified.  559 F.2d  at 251.  The co-defendants were all 
accused of criminal conspiracy in an antitrust context.  Id. at 252.  The court stated, “In such a 
situation, an attorney who is the recipient of such information breaches his fiduciary duty if 
he later, in his representation of another client, is able to use this information to the 
detriment of one of the co-defendants.”  Id. at 253.  The court did not have enough 
information about what had been shared with the attorney to make a disqualification 
determination.  Id.  
298. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 5 n.3. 
299. Id.  The Opinion cites an early draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. g(ii) (2000), which, in final form, states, 
 
 A lawyer who learns confidential information from a person represented by 
another lawyer pursuant to a common-interest sharing arrangement (see § 76) is 
precluded from a later representation adverse to the former sharing person when 
information actually shared by that person with the lawyer or the lawyer’s client is 
material and relevant to the later matter (see Illustration 8, above).  Such a 
threatened use of shared information is inconsistent with the undertaking of 
confidentiality that is part of such an arrangement. 
Id. § 132 cmt. g(ii). 
300. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395, at 5. 
301. Id. 
08-GIESEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:05 PM 
542 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:475 
 
3. Disqualification Law: No Attorney–Client Relationship 
Courts dealing with questions of disqualification resulting from 
allied lawyer situations agree that an attorney in an allied lawyer 
situation does not have an attorney–client relationship with the 
members of the group.  For example, in United States v. Stepney,302 the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, when dealing with 
a disqualification issue arising from an allied lawyer setting, clarified 
that an attorney in such a situation does not represent members of the 
group other than the lawyer’s separate client.303  In discussing Wilson P. 
Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,304 another case 
addressing disqualification arising from an allied lawyer situation, the 
Stepney court stated, 
 
 Despite the analogy to attorney–client relationships, the 
Abraham Construction court did not treat the attorney’s 
participation in a joint defense agreement as identical to formal 
representation of a client.  Had plaintiff’s attorney actually 
represented [the group member], he would have been 
disqualified automatically on the irrebuttable presumption that 
he had gained confidences during the prior representation on a 
related matter.  Finding that there had been “no direct attorney–
client relationship,” the court refused to presume that plaintiff’s 
attorney had obtained confidential information in the course of 
the joint defense.  The court instead placed the burden on the 
party moving for disqualification to prove that the plaintiff’s 
attorney had actually been privy to confidential information. . . . 
. . .  While a joint defense agreement does impose a duty of 
confidentiality, that duty is limited in that the showing required 
to establish a conflict of interest arising from prior participation 
in a joint defense agreement is significantly higher than that 
required to make out a conflict based on former representation 
of a client.305 
 
Thus, the Stepney and Abraham Construction courts, for purposes of 
conflict-of-interest disqualification, applied a different analysis to the 
 
302. 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
303. Id. at 1076. 
304. 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977). 
305. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (quoting Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 
F.2d at 253 (citations omitted)). 
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allied lawyer setting than to a situation in which a lawyer once 
represented the party in question.  Clearly, these courts did not view an 
attorney in an allied lawyer setting as having an attorney–client 
relationship with the members of the group other than the attorney’s 
separate client. 
When facing disqualification issues, other courts similarly have not 
viewed an attorney in an allied lawyer situation as having an attorney–
client relationship with the members of the group other than the 
member separately represented by the lawyer.  These courts’ 
disqualification analyses proceed by focusing on the information 
actually obtained by the lawyer, not on the basis of presumptions of 
information flow that would arise if an attorney–client relationship 
existed between the lawyer and the members of the group in an allied 
lawyer setting.306 
4. Conclusion: No Attorney–Client Relationship for Purposes of 
Privilege 
The law regarding the recognition of the existence of an attorney–
client relationship makes clear that an attorney in an allied lawyer 
situation does not have an attorney–client relationship with the other 
members of the group simply as a result of the joint effort.  ABA 
Opinion 95-395 expresses the view that such a lawyer does not have an 
attorney–client relationship with members of the group even though the 
lawyer may owe the nonclient members of the joint effort a derivative 
fiduciary duty to keep information confidential.307  Also, the courts, in 
dealing with disqualification questions, have required a higher level of 
proof when the claimed disqualification arises from an allied lawyer 
setting.308  These courts have not presumed that a lawyer was privy to 
confidential information of the group’s members as such a court would 
presume if the court believed that the lawyer represented the party and 
thus had an attorney–client relationship with the party.309 
 
306. Subsequent courts have followed suit in requiring a showing that the attorney 
actually obtained confidences before disqualifying counsel.  See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell 
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 251–52 (D.N.J. 1998); GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 
1575, 1580 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  See generally Arnold Rochvarg, Joint Defense Agreements and 
Disqualification of Co-Defendant’s Counsel, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311 (1998). 
307. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995). 
308. See supra Part V.C.3. 
309. See supra Part V.C.3. 
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Likewise, attorney–client privilege law should not treat an attorney 
in an allied lawyer setting as having an attorney–client relationship with 
all members of the group.  As these other areas of law make clear, the 
Chahoon court was not correct in concluding that a lawyer in an allied 
lawyer setting represents the members of the group.310  Absent the 
attorney–client relationship, there is no basis for applying the privilege 
in the allied lawyer setting. 
D.  An Expansion of the Privilege Contrary to Traditional Privilege 
Doctrine 
In the allied lawyer setting, many communications that are not 
between an attorney and client enjoy the protection of the privilege and 
thus are not subject to compelled disclosure.  This is a broad expansion 
of the character of communications not presentable to the truth-finder 
and a substantial increase in the quantity of communications not subject 
to disclosure and not available to the truth-finder. 
This expansion of the reach of the attorney–client privilege 
contradicts the long held and much repeated mantra that courts should 
apply the privilege narrowly.311  In University of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC,312 the United States Supreme Court contemplated whether to 
recognize a privilege for peer review.  The Court acknowledged that, in 
light of the fact that recognition of a privilege keeps evidence from the 
truth-finder, “[w]e do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege 
 
310. The Chahoon court stated, “[T]he counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, 
though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client.” 62 
Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 842 (1871).  Having established the relationship, the court found 
communications in the allied lawyer setting to be privileged, stating “confidential 
communications from client to counsel, during the existence of this relationship, and about a 
professional matter, are privileged.”  Id. at 843. 
311. See, e.g., Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Because the attorney–client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information 
from the factfinder, it is applied only when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of 
encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to his or her attorney.”); Harrisburg Auth. 
v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 380, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“‘It is well established 
that evidentiary privileges . . . are generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.’  
The attorney client privilege is one such evidentiary privilege.” (quoting Pa. Dep’t. of Transp. 
v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (Pa. 2004))); Sieger v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 
2009) (“Since the attorney–client privilege constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process, 
however, the protection claimed must be narrowly construed, and its application must be 
consistent with the purposes underlying the immunity.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
312. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).  
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unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need 
for probative evidence.’”313  The Court noted that because privileges 
block evidence, any such privilege must “‘be strictly construed.’”314  In 
Virmani v. Novant Health Inc.,315 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit cautioned: 
 
When considering whether to recognize a privilege, a court must 
begin with “the primary assumption that there is a general duty 
to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any 
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so 
many derogations from a positive general rule.”316 
 
Recognizing the application of the attorney–client privilege in the 
allied lawyer setting does not “‘promote[] sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”317 
Not only is this an expansion of attorney–client privilege law, but 
recognizing the privilege in the allied lawyer setting has no basis in the 
common law.318  As explained above, applying the privilege to the allied 
lawyer setting is a relatively recent occurrence.319  Only four cases before 
1966 did so.320  Such an application of the privilege is not so engrained in 
our judicial firmament such that a rejection of it would wreak havoc on 
the judicial system. 
E.  Lack of Supporting Rationale 
Perhaps the expansion of the privilege could be justified if the 
expansion captured a significant benefit.  For example, if applying the 
privilege in the allied lawyer setting furthered the rationale of the 
privilege itself, then the expansion might be justified.  But it does not.  
 
313. Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
314. Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50). 
315. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001). 
316. Id. at 287 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996)).  
317. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51). 
318. See Lerner, supra note 6, at 1514 (“[I]t is plainly a departure from the traditional 
privilege rules.”). 
319. See supra Part III.C. 
320. The four cases are Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871); 
Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. 1942); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 
F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964); and Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).  
For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see supra Parts III.A–.B. 
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The rationale of the privilege is to create an environment of superior 
legal advice by encouraging client disclosure to the client’s attorney.  In 
the allied lawyer setting, the clients are not disclosing anything new to 
their own attorneys.  Applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting 
does not, therefore, further attorney–client communications.321 
Even so, the expansion of the privilege might be justified if it created 
a benefit that outweighed the harm from keeping information from the 
truth-finder.  There is no such rationale. 
Rationales that have been suggested revolve around claims of 
effectiveness322 and efficiency.323  For example, the Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers presents its rationale for applying the 
privilege in the allied lawyer setting thusly: 
 
The rule . . . permits persons who have common interests to 
coordinate their positions without destroying the privileged 
status of their communications with their lawyers.  For example, 
 
321. See United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (“When a 
defendant conveys information to the lawyer of his co-defendant, as opposed to his own 
lawyer, the justification for protecting the confidentiality of the information is weak.  The 
policy of fostering frank communication with an attorney is already facilitated by privileging 
those communications made to the defendant’s own attorney; little can be gained by 
extending the privilege to those communications made to attorneys that do not represent the 
defendant.”); see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1480 (“[S]haring of client confidences with 
another attorney does not accord with the attorney–client privilege because it in no sense 
furthers a client’s ability to confide in his attorney.”). 
322. See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Applying the common interest doctrine to the full range of communications otherwise 
protected by the attorney–client privilege encourages parties with a shared legal interest to 
seek legal ‘assistance in order to meet legal requirements and to plan their conduct’ 
accordingly.  This planning serves the public interest by advancing compliance with the law, 
‘facilitating the administration of justice’ and averting litigation.  Reason and experience 
demonstrate that joint venturers, no less than individuals, benefit from planning their 
activities based on sound legal advice predicated upon open communication.” (quoting In re 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1996))); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 
F.R.D. 220, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “joint defense agreements present a pooling of 
resources, a healthy exchange of vital information, a united front against a common litigious 
foe, and the marshaling of legal talent and advice”); see also Lerner, supra note 6, at 1479 
(stating that the privilege allows “more effective legal representation than would be possible 
without the disclosures”); Rushing, supra note 247, at 1274 (noting that cooperation is often 
required for effective legal representation); Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 60 
(noting court opinions that find the privilege encourages communication between parties so 
that the parties receive effective representation). 
323. See, e.g., Mahaffey, supra note 247, at 28–29 (allows for a more efficient 
representation). 
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where conflict of interest disqualifies a lawyer from representing 
two co-defendants in a criminal case . . ., the separate lawyers 
representing them may exchange confidential communications 
to prepare their defense without loss of the privilege.  Clients 
thus can elect separate representation while maintaining the 
privilege in cooperating on common elements of interest.324 
 
Ultimately, both clients and the “system . . . benefit[] . . . since 
enabling cooperation is likely to save court time as common strategies 
are put into play.”325  The argument is that “collaborative 
communications . . . will not likely happen at all if there is no 
privilege.”326 
Most courts do not mention a rationale for applying the privilege in 
the allied lawyer setting, though a few do.  For example, in Continental 
Oil Co. v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized 
application of the privilege after the claimants of the privilege had 
argued that the communications were intended “to make their 
representation of their clients . . . more effective.”327  And, in Hunydee v. 
United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the 
privilege applied when the communications “are intended to facilitate 
representation.”328 
 
324. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. b (2000); 
see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571 (“The reason to apply the 
privilege in this setting is to make it possible for clients with separate lawyers to cooperate in 
the development of common positions.”). 
325. MUELLER &  KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571. 
326. Id. 
327. 330 F.2d 347, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1964). 
328. 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).  See also In re Condemnation City of Phila., where 
the court stated, 
 
As a policy matter, the joint defense doctrine is highly desirable because it 
allows for greater efficiency in the handling of litigation.  Frequently, co-
defendants with essentially the same interests must retain separate counsel to 
avoid potential conflicts over contingent or subsidiary issues in the case.  To 
avoid duplication of efforts, such defendants should be able to pool their 
resources on matters of common interest.  This can be done most effectively if 
both counsel can attend and participate in interviews with each other’s 
clients. . . .  With multi-party cases becoming so frequent, and with litigation 
costs spiraling upwards—some would say out of control, the courts should not 
deny defendants the ability to pool their resources and coordinate their efforts 
on issues of common interest. 
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While it is possible that applying the privilege to the allied lawyer 
setting creates efficiencies in representation, it is also very possible that 
recognition of the privilege in this setting does no such thing.  When 
parties join together in a common effort but with separate lawyers, it is 
true that the attorneys can divide up the needed work on the matter; not 
every client must pay to have its separate attorney complete every step.  
But work on a legal matter is not finite.  More lawyers may mean that 
more work is done.  The lawyers may not divide the work.  Even if work 
is divided, each lawyer must remain wary and cautious, and must take 
on a monitoring function regarding the work done by lawyers for the 
other members of the joint endeavor.  One cannot say that each client 
pays less or that each lawyer bills fewer hours in an allied lawyer context 
than when parties and counsel act separately.329 
It is possible that applying the privilege to the allied lawyer setting 
creates efficiencies with regard to the justice system as a whole.  It is also 
very possible that recognition of the privilege in this setting does not 
decrease systemic costs in any way.  Parties working together are not 
likely to present inconsistent positions and therefore judicial 
proceedings may be less lengthy, but such is not a foregone conclusion.  
The same amount of judicial resources may be used in a joint endeavor 
situation with separate lawyers.  The opposition may simply require 
more judicial resources to develop its position as a result of the united 
front of the parties working jointly.330  And certainly this efficiency 
argument fails when the parties elect to dissolve the joint endeavor.  
When the parties are not involved in a litigation matter, any suggestion 
of systemic benefit is even weaker. 
At least one commentator has argued that recognition of the 
privilege in the allied lawyer setting involving a criminal matter is a 
constitutionally required benefit.331  The argument is that the privilege is 
necessary to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
 
981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Young v. 
Presbyterian Homes Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C. 4th 190, 198 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2001)). 
329. See Lerner, supra note 6, at 1528–30 (joint effort allows for multiplying of work by 
lawyers). 
330. See id. at 1530 (positing that in the criminal context additional prosecutorial 
resources may be required as prosecutors have to access other evidence because cooperation 
with the prosecutors may decrease as the result of a joint endeavor by the defendants). 
331. See, e.g., Bartel, supra note 6, at 872–73; see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 
F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that the joint defense doctrine is a “vital and important 
part of the client’s right to representation by counsel”). 
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because a fair trial is only possible if defendants have an “unpenalized 
opportunity to coordinate the defense.”332  No federal court has so 
held.333  But a Pennsylvania court has recognized that prosecutorial 
intrusion into an allied lawyer setting could be a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  In Commonwealth v. Scarfo, the court stated, 
 
The possibility that intrusions may occur heightens when 
multiple parties are the subject of a group defense.  In such a 
case it would be reasonable for a defendant to assume that the 
other defendants are allied with him or her and that the 
confidentiality of statements made for the benefit of group 
preparation would stay confidential within the group until the 
appropriate time for disclosure, perhaps at trial.  “Defendants 
have both the right to prepare a group defense and the right to 
communicate privately with counsel; constitutional principles 
forbid requiring a defendant to waive one of these rights in order 
to exercise the other.”334 
 
Even so, this statement is not a recognition of a constitutional right 
to application of the attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer 
scenario when prosecutorial intrusion is not an issue.  There is, of 
course, no constitutional right argument in the civil context. 
Perhaps the strongest argument of a benefit gained from applying 
the attorney–client privilege to the allied lawyer setting is that 
 
332. See Bartel, supra note 6, at 871–73. 
333. In United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995), the court evaluated a 
claim by a defendant that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by not being able 
to confer with counsel of other defendants.  The court found no merit in the argument 
because the defendant had the opportunity to confer.  Id.  The court did not address whether 
such a denial would in fact be an affront to the Sixth Amendment because the factual basis 
for the claim was lacking.  Id. 
334. 611 A.2d 242, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting Note, Government Intrusions into 
the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1984)); 
see also In re Condemnation by City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).  The 
City of Philadelphia court, in a civil context, stated, “In Scarfo, our superior court held that 
defendants have both the right to prepare a group defense and the right to communicate 
privately with counsel.  Constitutional principles forbid requiring a party to waive one of 
these rights in order to exercise the other.”  Id. at 397.  Ultimately, the court did not apply the 
privilege because the parties did not share a proper common interest.  Id. at 398–99.  In 
United States v. Almeida, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “in light of the vast resources of the 
government” in a prosecution, perhaps allowing privileged collaboration leveled the playing 
field.  341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003).  
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recognition of the privilege creates an environment that encourages 
parties to share information, thereby assisting their lawyers to provide 
more effective representation.335  This rationale differs from the 
traditional attorney–client privilege rationale in that the attorney–client 
privilege is intended to encourage attorney–client communication.  That 
communication is believed to lead to improved representation.  The 
rationale for applying the privilege to the allied lawyer setting is that 
recognition of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting will allow for 
cooperation between parties and increased communication such that the 
representation of the client by the client’s separate lawyer will be 
superior.  It is possible that the increased communication between and 
among the parties and their counsel creates a benefit in some cases (that 
being more effective representation).  But the connection between the 
disclosure encouraged by the privilege and the improved representation 
seems much weaker than is true in the regular attorney–client privilege 
setting. 
Even if applying the attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer 
situation creates some benefit, the damage inflicted to the truth-finding 
mission of the justice system greatly outweighs that benefit.336  Applying 
the privilege in the allied lawyer setting means many communications 
are protected from disclosure that would not be protected otherwise.  
Some of those communications may not have occurred absent the 
promise of privilege protection, but some of those communications 
 
335. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Whether 
an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly interested persons are defendants 
or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale 
for the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in 
litigation should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other 
to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims.”); Fojtasek v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 262 
F.R.D. 650, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249). 
336. See James M. Fischer, The Attorney–Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest 
Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 
REV. LITIG. 631, 650–51 (1997) (“Of course, recognition of the privilege means that 
information relevant to the decision-making process is not accessible by all interested 
individuals.  Since the making of decisions with full information is generally understood to be 
more desirable than the contrary, the cost of realizing the benefits of privilege recognition is 
that the decision-making process may be less accurate than if decision-making were based on 
all relevant information.”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the 
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1641–42 (1986) (“At some point widespread circulation of 
privileged information threatens to make a mockery of justice if, due to his inability to obtain 
the information or offer it in evidence, the opponent is subjected to a judicial result that many 
others (who do have the information) know to be wrong.”). 
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undoubtedly would have occurred.337 
Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham were correct in 
stating, “[N]o one has ever made a convincing argument that strategy 
sessions among co-defendants produce a benefit to the legal system that 
outweighs the cost of the loss of evidence to the courts.”338  As 
eloquently stated by Professor Craig Lerner, “[N]ot everything that 
improves legal representation is covered by the attorney–client 
privilege.”339 
F.  The Nuts and Bolts Problems in Courts’ Current Application of the 
Privilege in the Allied Lawyer Setting 
Even if the application of the privilege in the allied lawyer situation 
could be justified, the current state of the law in applying the privilege is 
impossibly confused340 and calls into question whether the privilege can 
apply.  This confusion undermines the certainty so necessary for any 
privilege to accomplish its goals.  If there is no certainty of application, 
the privilege has no value because no one can know that a 
communication is privileged when that communication occurs.341 
 
337. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5493 (noting that expansion of the 
attorney–client privilege to allied lawyers “also reduces the flow of information to the 
court”).  
338. Id.; see also Mahaffey, supra note 5, at 684 (“Under a utilitarian approach, an allied-
party doctrine or common-interest rule (at least as between the government and relator in a 
qui tam case) would be so expansive that the costs to the judicial process would outweigh any 
societal benefit.”); Note, supra note 141, at 1034 (writing when only a few courts had 
recognized application of the privilege in the allied lawyer setting, the student author 
surmised, “the tactical advantage in an exchange of information among independently hired 
attorneys might be deemed of insufficient social importance to justify an extension of the 
privilege”). 
339. Lerner, supra note 6, at 1480. 
340. It would be hard to improve on Professor Lerner’s eloquent statement when 
discussing the doctrine in the criminal context: “The joint defense privilege is characterized 
today by a core certainty as to the existence of a privilege of some sort and a confounding 
uncertainty as to the precise details.”  Id. at 1490. 
341. See Daniel J. Capra, The Attorney–Client Privilege in Common Representations, 
TRIAL LAW. Q., Summer 1989, at 20, 21 (noting that confusion is costly because “it is crucial 
for the attorney and client to know at the outset whether proposed communications are 
within the privilege”); Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 65 (noting that there is 
a great deal of uncertainty so parties are discouraged from disclosure); Garsombke, supra 
note 247, at 620–21 (noting that reliance is impossible because the application is so confused); 
see also Gregory J. Kopta, Comment, Applying the Attorney–Client Privilege and Work 
Product Privileges to Allied Party Exchange of Information in California, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
151, 153 (1988) (“Continuing uncertainty exacts a high price.  Fear of waiver in general is very 
expensive to both the participants and the legal system itself.”). 
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1. Common Interest Confusion 
One source of this confusion is the requirement that the 
communications involve parties who share a common interest if the 
privilege is to apply.  This interest is not easily defined and is impossible 
to apply in a predictable way in such a vast array of scenarios.  All courts 
agree that parties in an allied lawyer setting who claim privilege 
protection must prove the existence of a common interest.342  Though an 
acceptable common interest almost always involves a more limited level 
of interest than in the joint representation setting,343 there is no 
agreement as to the appropriate level of common interest required.344 
In fact, developing a definition of common interest that can be 
applied across the panoply of fact situations seems a daunting task.  For 
example, a widely-quoted test of common interest is that of Duplan 
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.345  The Duplan court stated, 
 
A community of interest exists among different persons or 
separate corporations where they have an identical legal interest 
with respect to the subject matter of a communication between an 
attorney and a client concerning legal advice. . . .  The key 
consideration is that the nature of the interest be identical, not 
similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.346 
 
Another typical treatment is found in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.347  
There, the court stated that the legal interests must be “demonstrably 
common” or the clients must have “substantial” risk of shared 
 
342. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing 
the requirement); see also RICE, supra note 19, § 4:35.  
343. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 72, § 5:20, at 571 (“[E]ach client has her 
own lawyer, and it is understood that their common interest is limited and they are already 
(or potentially) adversaries on other related matters, in a situation in which a single lawyer 
could not properly represent both.”); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.4. 
344. See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36 (“There is no clear standard for measuring the 
community of interests that must exist for the privilege to apply.”). 
345. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974). 
346. Id. at 1172.  Duplan is still the majority rule.  See RICE, supra note 19, § 4:36.  The 
Restatement definition is broader.  It states: “[T]he common interest . . . may be either legal, 
factual, or strategic in character.  The interests of the separately represented clients need not 
be entirely congruent.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 
cmt. e (2000). 
347. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976). 
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exposure.348  In Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of the 
Treasury,349 the court stated that “[t]he interest must be a common legal 
interest, not merely a common commercial interest.”350  The court 
continued that “[s]uch a common interest exists where ‘the parties have 
been, or may potentially become, co-parties to a litigation . . . or have 
formed a coordinated legal strategy.’”351 
Common interest might be a simple concept easily applied if the 
context is cooperation of two criminal defendants.  But courts today 
apply a privilege in all sorts of allied lawyer civil settings.  Sometimes 
the parties who have joined together are plaintiffs rather than 
defendants.352  Sometimes the parties working together are not involved 
in any current or potential litigation.353  Defining and analyzing the 
existence of a common interest in such a variety of contexts is beyond 
the reach of most mortals. 
The task of interpreting these definitions of common interest and 
applying these statements is largely one left to the judgment of the 
reviewing court long after the communication has occurred and the 
privilege has been claimed.  The common interest requirement is simply 
too malleable on a case by case basis to provide any certainty with 
regard to its application. 
2. Confusion About the Necessity of an Agreement 
There are other areas of confusion that make application of the 
privilege to the allied lawyer setting problematic.  For example, courts 
disagree about whether an agreement to work together jointly is 
necessary.  This is a manifestation of disagreement about the extent to 
which there must be proof of joint intent.  In Hunton & Williams v. U.S. 
 
348. Id. at 524–25; see also Square D Co. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 385, 391 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (requiring a “common legal interest . . . as opposed to a common commercial 
interest”). 
349. 739 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
350. Id. at 563. 
351. Id. at 563 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on N.Y. Marine & Gen. 
Ins. Co., No. M 8-85 (MHD), 1997 WL 599399, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1997)); see also 
Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 69–74 (discussing definitions and applications 
of the common interest standard). 
352. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990). 
353. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It applies in 
civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”); see also RICE, supra 
note 19, § 4:35. 
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Department of Justice,354 the court rejected the notion that “mere 
‘indicia’ of joint strategy” provides the required intent to collaborate.355  
The court stated, “While agreement need not assume a particular form, 
an agreement there must be.”356 In HSH Nordbank AG New York 
Branch v. Swerdlow,357 the court stated, “Courts in this circuit have 
acknowledged that although the common interest doctrine applies only 
where a party has demonstrated the existence of an agreement to pursue 
a common legal strategy, the agreement need not be in writing.”358 And 
in Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Electronics, Inc.,359 the court stated, 
“A written agreement is not required, but the parties must invoke the 
privilege: they must intend and agree to undertake a joint defense 
effort.”360 
In Hunydee v. United States, however, the court made no mention of 
the existence of an agreement in a matter in which it seemed there was 
no agreement.361  There is a danger that recognizing a common interest 
of some sort may be taken as sufficient proof of intent to proceed 
jointly. 
If there is a joint defense or prosecution agreement (or some other 
agreement to jointly proceed in an allied lawyer setting), and if that 
agreement, as it usually does, commits the parties to maintaining the 
confidentiality of information revealed in the context of the joint 
endeavor, then the parties to the agreement are contractually bound to 
not reveal the information to third parties.  Such an agreement is 
evidence of a joint endeavor for purposes of a court applying the 
 
354. 590 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2010). 
355. Id. at 284–85. 
356. Id. at 285; see also United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(finding no joint privilege because no joint defense agreement existed at the time of the 
communication); Post v. Killington, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 393, 397 (D. Vt. 2009) (“[T]he critical 
questions are whether those making and receiving the challenged communications (1) 
actually had a common interest with respect to the investor passes, and (2) had reached a 
joint strategy agreement at the time the communications were made.”); Lugosch v. Congel, 
219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In order . . . for documents and communications 
shared amongst these litigants to be considered confidential, there must exist an agreement, 
though not necessarily in writing, embodying a cooperative and common enterprise towards 
an identical legal strategy.”). 
357. 259 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
358. Id. at 72 n.12. 
359. 516 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
360. Id. at 1203. 
361. 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); see also discussion of the Hunydee case supra Part 
III.B.3. 
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attorney–client privilege and is evidence of the intent of the parties to 
maintain confidentiality.  The agreement should not, however, control 
the application of the privilege; a communication should not be 
privileged because the parties agree that it is.  Only the courts should be 
the arbiters of whether the privilege applies to communications.362 
3. Confusion About the Necessity of Litigation 
A third source of confusion about the application of the privilege to 
the allied lawyer setting is that courts do not agree about whether 
litigation must exist for the privilege to apply.  Some courts apply the 
privilege in allied lawyer settings not involving litigation.363  For 
example, in United States v. United Technologies Corp.,364 the court 
applied the privilege to a situation in which members of a joint endeavor 
shared legal advice in an effort to minimize tax liabilities.  The 
communications at issue “pertain[ed] to the development of a common 
legal strategy” and “the members acted not as adversaries negotiating at 
arms length but as collaborators.”365  Justifying this stance, the court in 
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, stated that “[r]eason and 
experience demonstrate that joint venturers, no less than individuals, 
benefit from planning their activities based on sound legal advice 
 
362. See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 441 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (“Of course, the mere existence of an agreement between parties to keep 
documents confidential is not, in itself, sufficient to protect them from discovery under a 
claim of privilege.”); see also Schaffzin, Common Interest, supra note 247, at 81–83 (explaining 
that the agreement cannot create the privilege). 
363. In Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 563 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court stated, “Although the doctrine is most frequently applied in the 
context of litigation, it also has been successfully invoked with respect to joint legal strategies 
in non-litigation settings.” 
364. 979 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1997). 
365. Id. at 112; see also Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 
Fed. Cl. 122, 144 (2007) (noting that “communications are privileged as against third parties, 
whether or not there is actual litigation in progress” (citing United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 
1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996))); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 958, 
965 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The fact that Whirlpool’s communications with its outside agencies 
were not in the context of litigation is of no moment because communications ‘need not be 
made in anticipation of litigation to fall within the common interest doctrine.’” (quoting 
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007))); HSH Nordbank AG 
N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The doctrine ‘precludes a 
waiver of the underlying privilege concerning confidential communications between the 
parties made in the course of an ongoing common enterprise and intended to further the 
enterprise, irrespective of whether an actual litigation is in progress.’” (quoting Sokol v. 
Wyeth, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8442(SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008))). 
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predicated upon open communication.”366 
In contrast, other courts require litigation to be on the horizon.  In 
United States v. Newell,367 the court stated that only two types of 
communications are privileged in the allied lawyer setting: 
“communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their 
counsel . . . [and] communications between potential co-defendants and 
their counsel . . . if there is ‘a palpable threat of litigation at the time of 
the communication.’”368  The Newell court continued, “a cognizable 
common legal interest does not exist if a group of individuals seeks legal 
counsel to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation, but rather only if 
they request advice to ‘prepar[e] for future litigation.’”369 
4. Confusion About Whom the Communication Must Involve 
Another source of confusion about the application of the privilege to 
the allied lawyer setting is that courts do not agree about who must be 
involved in a communication for the privilege to apply to that 
communication.  There is some agreement.  Courts agree that the 
privilege can apply when two lawyers, each representing a separate 
member of a group working together, share otherwise privileged 
information.370  The attorneys are sharing information gleaned from 
confidential conversations with their respective clients.  The purpose of 
the original communications was obtaining legal advice and not in 
furtherance of a crime or fraud.  As the Third Circuit in In re Teleglobe 
Communications Corp. stated with regard to requiring the 
 
366. 492 F.3d at 816. 
367. 315 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2002). 
368. Id. at 525 (quoting In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710, 711 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
369. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d at 713). 
370. See, e.g., Cooper Health Sys. v. Virtua Health, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 208, 214 (D.N.J. 
2009) (“Further, the privilege does not extend to communications between non-attorneys 
who simply have a joint interest.  The community of interest privilege is applicable to 
communications amongst attorneys, ‘to be eligible for continued protection, the 
communication must be shared with the attorney of the member of the community of 
interest.’” (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007))); see 
also United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 29 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (“When a person provides information to another without first consulting his own 
attorney, it is difficult to see how the information was given as part of a joint defense, even 
when the recipient may be viewed as a party with similar interests.  The difficulty grows when 
the person furnishing the information fails to inform his attorney of what he has done for 
several months.  This raises the inference that the information was not intended to be used for 
that person’s defense much less a joint defense.  Under these circumstances, the joint defense 
privilege is not available.”). 
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communication to involve attorneys, “The attorney-sharing requirement 
helps prevent abuse by ensuring that the common-interest privilege only 
supplants the disclosure rule when attorneys, not clients, decide to share 
information in order to coordinate legal strategies.”371 
Some courts may not require both parties to the communication to 
be attorneys but may require the presence of at least one attorney.372  
Some courts are even less demanding.  For example, in Gucci America, 
Inc. v. Gucci, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
explicitly rejected the notion that an attorney was necessary for the 
communication to be privileged.373  The court stated, “If information 
that is otherwise privileged is shared between parties that have a 
common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no 
attorney either creates or receives the communication.”374  Other courts 
agree.375 
 
371. Id. at 365. 
372. See United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The defendants 
would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations among the 
defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of those 
conversations.  Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is rejected.”); 
see also Square D Co. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 385, 391 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denying the 
privilege and stating, “EI has not even demonstrated that the subject communications were 
made to or by an attorney”); Post v. Killington, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 393, 397 (D. Vt. 2009) 
(holding there is no privilege in absence of attorneys); Harper-Wyman Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life 
Ins. Co., No. 86 C 9595, 1991 WL 62510, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1991) (“This is 
problematical, as communications between joint plaintiffs or joint defendants outside of 
counsel’s presence are not protected under the joint defense theory.”). 
373. No. 07 Civ. 6820, 2008 WL 5251989, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008). 
374. Id.  
375. See, e.g., Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, No. 07 C 0949, 2009 WL 1346256, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. May 13, 2009) (“Importantly for our purposes here, the common interest doctrine may 
apply in certain circumstances to communications between two non-lawyers who are both 
covered by the common interest.”); HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 
F.R.D. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (responding to party’s argument that the privilege did not 
apply to sharing of a communication with a third party and argument that the privilege 
applied only to sharing with the third party’s lawyer, and finding the argument “meritless”); 
Reginald Martin Agency, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 915, 918 (S.D. Ind. 
2006) (“Defendants urge this Court to adopt those cases that appear to stand for the 
proposition that the common interest doctrine does not extend attorney–client privilege to 
communications between parties made outside the presence of counsel.  While such a 
conclusion is tempting on first blush, closer scrutiny suggests otherwise.”). 
In Pucket v. Hot Springs School District No. 23-2, the court stated, 
 
In IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust Co., the third-party defendant sought discovery of 
several communications between two parties who had a common interest.  The 
third-party defendant argued that the common interest doctrine did not apply 
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With so much confusion surrounding the application of the 
attorney–client privilege in the allied lawyer setting, clients and lawyers 
cannot predict with any degree of certainty whether a communication 
will enjoy the protection of the privilege.  If clients and lawyers cannot 
predict that communications will be protected from disclosure, these 
clients and lawyers cannot be encouraged to speak freely.  Thus, any of 
the goals sought to be accomplished by applying the privilege in the 
allied lawyer setting are not achieved. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The attorney–client privilege, throughout history, has applied to the 
joint client representation setting.  Courts and commentators have never 
directly questioned this application, nor should they question it.  The 
attorney–client privilege is as inherent a part of a joint representation as 
it is in any attorney–client relationship.  Applying the privilege in the 
joint client representation setting is consistent with the privilege’s 
underlying rationale.  Unfortunately, some courts may have become a 
bit confused about the privilege’s application to the joint client setting; 
this confusion is an unfortunate result of courts struggling with the 
privilege in the allied lawyer setting. 
In contrast and contrary to the practice of modern courts, courts 
should not apply the privilege to the allied lawyer setting.  Applying the 
privilege in this setting does not further the rationale of the attorney–
client privilege and such application contradicts the traditional approach 
of applying the privilege narrowly.  In addition, the precedential basis 
for applying the privilege in the allied lawyer setting is that the allied 
lawyer setting and the joint client representation setting are identical.  
They are not.  Communications in the joint client situation are 
communications between attorney and clients of that attorney.  Such is 
not the case in the allied lawyer setting. 
 
because the communications occurred outside the presence of the parties’ 
attorneys. . . .   
 This court finds the district court’s reasoning in IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust 
Co. . . . persuasive.  The court thus adopts it here.  As a result, the court finds that 
Spitzer’s communication of confidential, privileged legal advice from the Becket 
Fund attorneys to the Puckets is protected by the common interest doctrine, even if 
these communications occurred outside the presence of the Becket Fund attorneys. 
239 F.R.D. 572, 583–84 (D.S.D. 2006) (discussing IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust Co. v. Cory & 
Assocs., No. CIV. A. 97 C 5827, 1999 WL 617842 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1999)). 
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The United States Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC, a case involving the question of creating a privilege for peer-
review communications, noted that because a privilege keeps evidence 
from the truth-finder, “[w]e do not create and apply an evidentiary 
privilege unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh 
the need for probative evidence.’”376  If courts today were writing on a 
blank slate such that no precedent existed that recognized the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer setting, those courts would not create 
such a doctrine. 
Courts looking at the matter anew would note that recognition of a 
privilege would be an expansion of the privilege.  The expansion would 
contradict the historical guiding principle that courts must apply the 
privilege narrowly because it inhibits the truth-finding mission of the 
justice system.  Courts would conclude that recognizing the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer situation would not further the 
rationale of the privilege—encouraging client disclosure to the client’s 
attorney for the ultimate goal of superior legal service.  Courts would 
conclude that no possible rationale justifies an expansion of the privilege 
to the allied lawyer setting given the accompanying harm such an 
expansion does to the truth-finding mission of the judicial system.  
Finally, these courts would understand that the allied lawyer setting is 
fundamentally different from the joint client representation setting.  The 
nature of the relationship between attorneys and clients is different.  In 
the joint client representation setting, the attorney–client privilege 
protects communications involving an attorney and that attorney’s 
clients.  The same cannot be said when the privilege is applied in the 
allied lawyer setting. In the allied lawyer setting, communications not 
involving a lawyer and the lawyer’s client may be privileged. 
Because courts today are not writing on a blank slate but have the 
benefit of recent precedent, it is clear that applying the privilege to the 
allied lawyer setting has resulted in a level of confusion of application 
that undermines any possible value created.  There is confusion about 
the kind of commonality necessary between the parties in the allied 
lawyer setting.377  There is confusion about whether the parties must 
reach an agreement to work together and the form such an agreement 
 
376. 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
377. See supra Part V.F. 
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should take.378  There is confusion about whether the matter must 
involve litigation.379  There is confusion about who can be a part of the 
communication.380  All of these defects of clarity destroy the certainty of 
application necessary for the privilege to achieve its goals.  As an added 
collateral effect, some of this confusion with regard to the allied lawyer 
setting also has created confusion with courts when they are dealing 
with the joint client representation situation—a setting, historically, that 
has been a model of clarity. 
In recent years courts have applied the attorney–client privilege in 
the allied lawyer setting without evaluating the basic normative question 
of whether the privilege should apply at all.  The courts have focused on 
the trees, not the forest.  The courts have assumed that Chahoon v. 
Commonwealth, the case that first applied the privilege to the allied 
lawyer setting, is theoretically sound.381  In fact, the analysis of the 
Chahoon court is flawed in concluding that the allied lawyer setting and 
the joint client setting should be treated alike for purposes of the 
attorney–client privilege. 
Now is the time to evaluate the application of the attorney–client 
privilege to the allied lawyer setting.  The vast majority of cases applying 
the privilege to the allied lawyer setting have been in the last few 
decades.  Now is the time to acknowledge the error and correct it. 
With respect to privileges in the federal system, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated in Pearson v. Miller,382 “[F]ederal courts are 
to assess the appropriateness of new privileges as they arise in 
particular cases, but they are to conduct that assessment with a 
recognition that only the most compelling candidates will overcome 
the law’s weighty dependence on the availability of relevant 
evidence.”383 
Courts should cast fresh eyes on the application of the attorney–
client privilege in the allied lawyer setting and “assess the 
appropriateness”384 of such an application.  As a result of such analysis, 
courts should conclude that the allied lawyer setting is not such a 
 
378. See supra Part V.F.1. 
379. See supra Part V.F.3. 
380. See supra Part V.F.4. 
381. See supra Parts III.B–.C. 
382. 211 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2000). 
383. Id. at 67. 
384. Id. 
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“compelling candidate”385 for application of the attorney–client 
privilege. 
 
 
385. Id. 
